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In the mid to late 1980s, the New York Public Library shared a city block
with a virtual open-air drug market. The Library unfortunately shared the block
between Fifth and Sixth Avenues and 42nd and 40th Streets with Bryant Park,
a rundown, drug-infested symbol of urban neglect.' Next to the Library,
broken fountains, cracked pavement, and swathes of dirt were all that reminded
wanderers, were they brave enough to enter, that the area had once been a
park.2 The condition of the area was a blight both on midtown Manhattan,
generally a posh environment, and the Library, one of the City's foremost
cultural facilities.
By the early 1990s, however, Bryant Park had changed. The fountains and
pavement had been completely reconstructed; grass grew in the park for
perhaps the first time in a decade. Where the Park was once "a park that
people avoided at all costs," it has now become "a place where office workers
go to eat lunch and loll in the sun."' Instead of tottering addicts with glassy
eyes, the Park hosted parties during the Democratic National Convention in
1992 and now features fashion shows.4 Improvements enabled neighborhood
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 1997; B.A. Harvard University, 1993. I would like to thank
Doug Lasdon of the Urban Justice Center in New York, N.Y., for encouraging me to learn about this
issue. I would also like to thank Robert A. Solomon for his guidance in writing this Note, Alison Flaum
and Lisa Daugaard of the Urban Justice Center for their thoughts and suggestions, and Quintin Johnstone
and John Simon for their helpful advice.
The author has contributed extensively to a currently pending lawsuit mentioned in this Note:
Kessler et al. v. Grand Central District Management Association, 95 Civ. 10029 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 28, 1995), brought with the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School
and the Urban Justice Center in New York, N.Y. No material obtained in the course of that litigation
has been used in this Note, except for the date of the filing of the case. All information has been
obtained independently.
1. See City Services: Let the Landlords Do It, ECONOMIST (London), Apr. 25, 1992, at 23
(characterizing Bryant Park as "a block behind the New York public library in midtown Manhattan and
once a haven for drug dealers"); see also James Traub, Street Fight, NEW YORKER, Aug. 1995, at 36
("The only reason to walk into Bryant Park... was to buy loose joints.").
2. See 42nd St. Retail Thrives After a Slow Transformation, REAL ESTATE WEEKLY, Dec. 22, 1993,
at 2 (characterizing Bryant Park as "a hotbed of criminal activity, a home to the downtrodden and
generally a place to avoid") [hereinafter Retail Thrives].
3. Lois Weiss, BIDs Making a Difference in NY Neighborhoods, REAL ESTATE WEEKLY, June 15,
1994, at 20.
4. See Weiss, supra note 3; see also Retail Thrives, supra note 2.
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landlords to charge higher rents.5 Much of the credit for the revitalization of
the area, for years the responsibility of municipal government, went to the
local Bryant Park Business Improvement District.
Immediately next to the Bryant Park Business Improvement District is the
Grand Central Partnership, within which falls Grand Central Terminal.6 The
Partnership boasts a track record similar to the Bryant Park District in
improving the business climate within its jurisdiction, which generally extends
from 35th to 54th Streets and First to Fifth Avenues.7 Yet the Partnership is
not only well known for turning the area around.8 It is also notorious for
allegedly hiring "goon squads" to roust homeless individuals from heating
grates, sidewalks, and doorways, using force if necessary.9 The Partnership
is well regarded for having taken care to raise the level of sanitation in the
district, but is also criticized for having taken even better care of its Chairman,
who earned $315,000 in 1995 from the Partnership and its affiliated dis-
tricts.10 Finally, the Partnership is hailed for having improved the business
climate in midtown Manhattan," but is assailed for having insured that the
benefits of this improvement have gone largely to its own members. 2
While America's cities seem trapped in a state of decline,' 3 Business
Improvement Districts, like the Grand Central Partnership and Bryant Park
District, are credited with bringing about a renaissance of downtown
commercial areas across the nation."' In general, business improvement
districts are quasi-independent bodies created to reenergize downtown urban
5. See Daniel E. North, Owners Must Commit to Constant Improvements, REAL ESTATE WEEKLY,
June 22, 1994, at 19.
6. Note, however, that Grand Central Terminal, as a municipal facility, is not a paying member
of the BID. See Lois Weiss, Grand Central BID readies for $30M in Capital Projects, REAL ESTATE
WEEKLY, Apr. 22, 1992, at IA.
7. See N.Y.C. DEP'T Bus. SERVS., NEW YORK CITY BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 43 (Aug.
1995) [hereinafter NYCDBS REPORT].
8. See Retail Thrives, supra note 2.
9. See Thomas J. Lueck, Public Needs, Private Answers-A Special Report: Business Districts
Grow, at Price of Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, § 1, at 1.
10. See Bruce Lambert, A Report Criticizes Improvement Zones in New York City, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1995. at Al.
11. See Traub, supra note 1, at 36 ("Ten years ago, the area around Grand Central Terminal, in
the heart of New York City, was a dismal symbol of urban decline and a constant reminder of the
nonchalance toward public life that separates New York from the world's other great cities.").
12. See Thomas J. Lueck, Creator of Business Zones is Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995,
at B3.
13. See Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1351, 1351 (1993) ("Perhaps the biggest challenge facing America today is the crisis in its cities."). See
generally Henry G. Cisneros, Meeting the Challenge of Urban Revitalization, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
633 (1994) (describing number of pressing urban problems). Two commentators note that the perceived
hopelessness of efforts to save troubled urban centers was such that no commission was appointed to
address this problem in the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riots. See E. Douglass Williams & Richard
H. Sander, The Prospects for "Putting America to Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003, 2003
(1993).
14. See Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Jr., Betting on BIDs, URBAN LAND, June 1994, at 13.
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areas through street improvements, improved sanitation, and increased security.
Most strikingly, these services are paid for not by the municipal government,
but by a self-imposed tax upon all properties within the district. 5 The success
of these districts, however, should not obscure the serious problems they may
create, both legal and political. This Note will attempt to weigh these benefits
and disadvantages and suggest possible avenues for reform. Although this Note
focuses on the Grand Central BID and the statutory framework that governs
BIDs in New York, it is hoped that this analysis may prove applicable to BIDs
generally.
Thus far, little scholarly attention has been given to the BIDs phenome-
non;'6 most of the public discussion about these entities has occurred in
general interest magazines and newspapers. While these accounts are in many
ways useful, they consistently overlook some of the fundamental issues
necessary to understand properly the operation of BIDs, and generally lack
proposals for reforming BID law to capture the benefits of these entities while
avoiding the harms.
This Note will first explain what BIDs are and do, along with a brief
history of their use from the early days of this nation to the present. Part II
will then critique New York's BID law,'7 arguing that the entities it creates
are undemocratic, enjoy unwarranted § 501(c)(3) not-for-profit status, harm
other parts of the city, and lack sufficient oversight. Part III will look to the
Grand Central Partnership as a case study of the benefits and harms BIDs entail
under New York law. Finally, Part IV will suggest how these harms can be
eliminated while retaining the benefits of the Grand Central Partnership's work.
I. THE RISE OF BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICITS
AS A CURE FOR URBAN ILLS
A. What is a BID?
Although the mere name "Business Improvement District" might seem
sufficiently self-explanatory, there is some confusion as to the nature of the
entity it denotes. The origin of this confusion can be traced both to the general
lack of knowledge about governmental entities below the state level" and the
15. See Sam Roberts, Metro Matters: By Taxing Itself, A Coalition Gives Life to a District, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1988, at BI ("When landlords raise real-estate taxes, that's news.").
16. A LEXIS search of the ALLREV law review database in December 1996, using the command
"business w/2 improvement w/2 district", turned up only nineteen articles with peripheral references
to the districts.
17. New York's BID law is at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
18. In 1957, a major work on special districts began with the observation that "[s]pecial districts,
particularly those in the nonschool category, constitute the 'new dark continent of American politics,'
a phrase applied earlier in the century to counties." JOHN C. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERN-
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use of the term "special district" to describe "an amorphous sort of scrap
heap" of governmental bodies.19 A BID is clearly a form of special district,
but defining that term is also problematic as "'no one acceptable definition of
what constitutes a special district has been formulated.'"' Part of the problem
is the vast range of functions special districts serve. Although four-fifths are
simply school districts,2' the rest include, for example, districts created for
sewage disposal, water pollution control, mosquito abatement, sidewalk
maintenance, water reclamation, and soil conservation. 22 Nevertheless, the
specificity of these functions lends credence to the claim that special districts
are "distinct, limited-purpose units of local government,"23 which may even
serve "as the alter ego" of conventional government.24 More specifically,
special districts are
organized to perform one or more governmental services or functions, are governed
by a board of directors who possess administrative independence from other units
of local government, have independent financial and revenue powers similar to
those of other local government units, and are separate corporate entities, with a
perpetual existence, created by state enabling legislation.'
The New York BID statute never defines exactly what a BID is. 26 However,
the entities it creates fulfill all of the conditions of the foregoing definition,27
MENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1957) (citation omitted). This is still true today. One commentator
refers to special purpose districts as "shadow governments." JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE
NEW FRONTIER 195 (1991). Other commentators, however, argue that special districts "have come of
age. No longer are they hidden and mysterious with little impact... on the civilized world." David
M. Hudson, Special Taxing Districts in Florida, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 49 (1982).
For more general discussions of special districts, see DANIEL R. MANDELKER, DAWN CLARK
NETSCH, & PETER W. SALSICH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-71
(2d ed. 1983); C. DALLAS SANDS, MICHAEL LIBONATI, & JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
§ 2.18 (1996).
19. MAx A. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA
PROBLEMS 10 (1962).
20. SANDS ET AL., supra note 18, at § 2.18 (quoting ROSs & MILSAP, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 106 (1966)).
21. See BOLLENS, supra note 18, at x.
22. See id. at 22.
23. Michael B. Phillips, Developments in Water Quality and Land Use Planning: Problems in the
Application of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 10 URB. L. ANN. 43, 101
(1975).
24. Hudson, supra note 18, at 50.
25. Phillips, supra note 23, at 101-02; see also POCK, supra note 19, at 10-11, who establishes the
additional qualification that such districts "invariably transcend] the maze of individual bordering lines."
Id. at 12.
26. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
27. For example, "organized to perform one or more governmental services or functions," is id.
§ 980-c, "governed by a board of directors who possess administrative independence from other units
of local government," is id. § 980-m, "have independent financial and revenue powers similar to those
of other local government units," is id. §§ 980-j,k, and m, and "are separate corporate entities, with
a perpetual existence," is id. § 980-n.
As the most striking feature of the modem business improvement district is its use of an assessment
on its members to fund district improvements, these entities may be more specifically designated as
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with the clear primary function of improving business in the designated area.
Most special districts, particularly BIDs, levy a special assessment or tax on
all property in the district to pay for improvements or special services.28
Whether one is concerned with "special assessment districts," "special
districts," or "business improvement districts," the primary reasons for their
creation are similar. First, such districts are created when it is felt that other
forms of government are ill-suited to handle a particular problem,29 whether
this is a failure in terms of size, financing, administration, or lack of sufficient
expertise to meet certain needs;3" second, there are financial limitations on
taxation ability and debt accumulation; 3 and third, there is a desire for more
autonomy, which may be linked to a sense that the local government entity
otherwise responsible for the service is doing an inadequate job.3 2 In addition,
multijurisdictional entities tend to attract a greater number of experienced
managers who are able to ensure a higher level service.33 These may seem to
be compelling reasons. However, some analysts caution that "[s]pecial districts
seem to be in danger of overuse; they are often created for areas which may
not really warrant 'special' treatment. "'4
Part of the necessity for seriously evaluating the power and impact of BIDs
is that they do not fit neatly into preexisting categories. While the awkwardness
of preexisting categories is partially the result of the historical evolution of
special assessment districts (SADs). Some analysts equate the two. See Janet Rothenberg Pack, BIDs,
DIDs, SIDs, SADs: Private Governments in Urban America, BROOKINGS REV. 18 (Fall 1992).
28. BIDs are thus quite different from enterprise zones, which are distressed urban areas granted
tax relief to encourage revitalization and development. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 543. A business in an enterprise zone enjoys lower taxes but a
business in a BID pays additional assessments on top of their ordinary tax burden. Furthermore,
enterprise zones do not have a separate management structure; BIDs and special districts do. See infra
Section ll.A.
29. This is particularly true of water management districts. See Phillips, supra note 23, at 102
("Often the territorial jurisdiction of an existing governmental unit does not conform to the area in need
of assistance."). Imposing governmental authority in developing areas also may require special districts;
Florida's reform of its special district law included a provision that would allow "limited government
status" for private developers who would do a better job setting up quasi-governmental services in
developing areas. See Hudson, supra note 18, at 64.
30. See BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 6.
31. See Phillips, supra note 23, at 103; see also BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 7 ("a general
government attaining its tax or debt limit is prevented from expanding functionally."). But see N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-n(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (providing that district with outstanding debt may
not be dissolved).
32. See Phillips, supra note 23, at 104; see also BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 9 ("Sometimes the low
caliber of present operations has decisive effect. There may be evidence or charges of inefficiency,
mismanagement, or unsavory political behavior.").
33. See Houstoun, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that the best downtown professional executives "are
sometimes the objects of bidding wars between downtown districts."); see also Comment, An Analysis
of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1376, 1429 (1973) (noting further that,
"Continuity of management, attraction of superior personnel, and corporate powers and decision-making
will be most beneficial in such areas as transportation, water supply and sewerage, port direction, and
pollution control.").
34. RICHARD F. BABCOCK & WENDY U. LARSEN, SPECIAL DISTRICTS: THE ULTIMATE IN
NEIGHBORHOOD ZONING 138 (1990).
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special districts, the common justifications for creating these quasi-governments
cast some light on their contemporary use.
B. The Origins of BIDS: Special Assessment Districts
Modern Business Improvement Districts have many ancestors, but two
types of entities are particularly relevant: special assessment districts that
sprang up largely in western rural areas; and metropolitan special districts that
were created in eastern and midwestem cities.35 The first are important
because they have shaped the case law on the issue.36 The problem pioneers
faced as the frontier moved west was very specific: water management. No
individual town, county, or city government was in a position to ensure that the
flow, distribution, and control of water remained constant; rivers or streams
might pass through several different jurisdictions. 37 Hence "[t]he modem
special district is an outgrowth of the drainage and flood control districts that
were created to encourage and facilitate development of the Northwest
Territory."3 8 The water-starved states of the Far West,39 however, were
possibly more important than the Northwest Territories in terms of generating
the law of special assessment districts. One major case of the early 1980s, for
example, involved the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power
District, which has existed in some form or another since 1895. °
Special districts also played a critical role in the development of cities,
particularly in the northeast and midwest. Their prominence, in part, stemmed
from aversion to centralized political authority." Influenced by dominant
"[d]ecentralized, Jacksonian styles of municipal administration,"42 street
paving, for example, was left up to the locals: "Abutters decided when and
35. These districts in turn may trace their lineage back to England, where special districts were "ad
hoc statutory authorities created by Parliament to fill the gap created by the inability and unwillingness
of English borough governments to respond to new problems." SANDS ET AL., supra note 18, § 2.18,
at 2-45.
36. See POCK, supra note 19, at 14 ("Much 'district law' has been made in controversies involving
insignificant rural districts.. . ."). This comment sounds a cautionary note about the relevance to urban
business districts of case law developed for governing water districts. See infra Section II.A.
37. The water districts are a good example of how the limits of existing governmental forms gives
rise to the need for specialized districts. See BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 6; Phillips, supra note 23, at
102-04.
38. Phillips, supra note 23, at 102.
39. For an extensive discussion of the problems facing Western states and the conditions which
gave rise to many irrigation districts, see Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (citing California Oregon Power Co.
v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 156-57 (1935)).
40. The election procedures in this district were at issue in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 357-59
(1981).
41. See Stanley K. Schultz & Clay McShane, To Engineer the Metropolis: Sewers, Sanitation, and
City Planning in Late-Nineteenth-Century America, 65 J. AMER. HIST. 389, 391 (1978).
42. Clay McShane, Transforming the Use of Urban Space: A Look at the Revolution in Street
Pavements, 1880-1924, 5 J. URB. HIST. 279, 284 (1979).
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how streets would be paved. " 4 The first special metropolitan districts for
such purposes were established in Philadelphia as early as 1790. Districts in
Chicago and Portland followed in the latter half of the nineteenth century."
Both Chicago and St. Louis grew largely through the use of metropolitan
districts, many of which survived well into the twentieth century.45 The most
famous Chicago districts included park districts, proposed by the legislature
and approved by referendum in 1869, 46 and the Sanitary District of Chicago,
created pursuant to an 1889 state law.47 Such districts served a variety of
functions. In addition to the most common "port facilities, sewage disposal,
water supply, and park[]" districts, metropolitan districts were also devoted to
"bridges, tunnels, airports, housing, libraries, and mass transit facilities" and
many other functions.48 Prominent metropolitan districts in the 1950s included
the New York-New Jersey Port Authority, the Bi-State Development District
in the area around St. Louis, and the East Bay Municipal Utility District in the
San Francisco-Oakland area.49 Prominent special districts created by New
York City in the 1960s and 1970s included the Special Theater District around
Times Square,50 the Clinton Preservation District,5" and a Special Park
Improvement District for Central Park.52
C. The Modem Business Improvement District
The modem business improvement district is a fairly distinct entity. While
the roots of BIDs run deep, in their current form they are barely two decades
old. Although subject to the same uncertainty in classification plaguing earlier
definitions of special assessment districts, all modem BIDs share three essential
characteristics:
43. Id. This aversion, however, gave way by 1990 to concerns that centralized authority was
necessary to improve urban health and safety. See id. at 285; Schultz & McShane, supra note 41, at
392-93.
44. See BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 67-68. For an extensive discussion of the role of special
districts in developing Chicago's suburbs, see ANN DURKIN KEATING, BUILDING CHICAGO: SUBURBAN
DEVELOPERS AND THE CREATION OF A DIVIDED METROPOLIS (1988).
45. See BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 63 (noting that only Cook County had more municipalities than
St. Louis County in 1952).
46. See id. at 133. These districts, which had their own taxing and bonding authority, proved so
popular that seven more were created between 1896 and 1911. See id. at 134. The modern statute is at
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1205/1-1-13-2 (West 1996).
47. See BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 74. Bollens, writing in the 1950s, explains that, "The first
sanitary district to be organized in Illinois, it is now the oldest active independent metropolitan district
government in the United States." Id. at 74. Modern sanitary districts in Illinois are governed by ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 2205/0.01-29.3.
48. BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 68.
49. See id. at 68. Pennsylvania was particularly active; it enacted general enabling legislation in
1935. See id. at 240. The modern statute is at 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1551-54 (West 1996).
50. See BABCOCK & LARSEN, supra note 34, at 29-35.
51. See id. at 45-49.
52. See id. at 101-04.
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First, their expenditures are restricted to one section of a city. Second, the districts
are organized and financed by property owners and merchants, who operate on the
basis of state and local laws that permit them to tax themselves. And third,
revenues are used to purchase supplemental services and capital improvements
beyond those provided by the city.53
One major difference, however, between modem BIDs and Old West water
management districts or nineteenth-century urban expansion districts is the
variety of services they provide. Florida's community development district
statute, for example, empowers districts to administer parks, fire prevention,
security, and waste collection services with the approval of local govern-
ment.54 Califortia's statute entrusts districts with responsibility for parking,
booths, kiosks, trash collection, public restrooms, lighting, street widening, and
other capital projects. 5 Most BIDs focus on "crime and grime," and others
may "pay for economic development and retail promotion and to sweep streets,
scrub graffiti, put up holiday decorations, and shovel snow."" Ordinary
special assessment districts tend to perform only one of these functions. 7
Most estimates of the number of BIDs currently operating in the United States
hover around 900.5 New York City alone has 34 separate BIDs.19 Very few
districts devoted to business improvement existed before 1980, and about half
have sprung up in the past five years." Currently forty states have laws
providing for the formation of BIDs. 6'
53. Pack, supra note 27, at 18. Hence one may define BIDs as a "quasi-public single-function
government by a majority of property owners in a limited area who agree to assess themselves a set
amount for a specific purpose." James Krohe, Jr., Bunker Metropolis: 'Private Government' Can Deliver
Good Services-For a Price, CHICAGO ENTERPRISE, Sept. 1993, at *2, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, nwltrs file. As demonstrated infra, the functions performed and purposes served by these
districts are often quite diverse.
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 190.012 (Harrison 1993). Such districts also have the power to sue
and be sued, enter into contracts, borrow money, issue bonds, and levy taxes. Id. at ch. 190.011.
55. See CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 36610 (Supp. 1996).
56. Krohe, supra note 53, at *2. One survey comparing New York BIDs with national entities
found that New York BIDs spent 27% on sanitation, compared to a national total of 31 %; New York
BIDs spent 23% on security, other BIDs across the nation spent 19%; New York BIDs spent 16% on
capital projects, compared to national total of 8 %; New York BIDs spent 11% on administration and
operations, compared to national total of 13%. Houstoun, supra note 14, at 13 (survey done by the
Atlantic Group).
57. See, e.g., Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding special district not state actor in district's dismissal of employee); Burris v. Sewer Improvement
Dist. No. 147, 743 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (rejecting equal protection challenge to special
district election because function so narrow); Patterson v. City of Bismarck, 212 N.W.2d 374 (N.D.
1973) (upholding assessment power of Parking Improvement District).
58. Pack notes that estimates go as high as 900. See Pack, supra note 27, at 18. Houstoun states
that there are 1000 in US and Canada. See Houstoun, supra note 14, at 16. Other sources suggest that
there are 1000 BIDs in the United States. See City Services, supra note 1.
59. See NYCDBS REPORT, supra note 7.
60. See Pack, supra note 27, at 18.
61. See Krohe, supra note 53, at *8. As not every state calls these entities "BIDs", the citations
below include the specific term used by the state statute.
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The most dramatic tool at the BID's disposal is, of course, the power to
assess.62 Whether an assessment is the same thing as a tax is not always clear.
Although the practical effect on property owners might be the same for an
assessment as a tax, BIDs proponents hastily dismiss any such comparison,63
and courts have provided some basis for distinguishing the two.' 4 State and
These states are Alabama, ALA. CODE § 11-54B-1-20 (1994) (Self-Help Business Improvement
Districts); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-701-724 (West Supp. 1996) (Community Facilities
Districts); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-184-101-130 (Michie 1987) (Central Business Improvement
Districts); California, CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36600-36651 (West Supp. 1996) (Business
Improvement Districts); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-1201-1225 (West 1995) (Business
Improvement Districts); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-339m-339t (1995) (Municipal Special
Services Districts); and Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1501-1507 (Supp. 1994) (Municipal
Business Improvement Districts).
See also Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 190.012-190.048 (Harrison Supp. 1993 & 1995)
(Community Development Districts); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 36-43-1-9 (1993) (City Business
Improvement Districts); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 50-2601-2622 (1995) (Business Improvement Districts);
Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/27-5-85 (1995) (Special Service Area Tax Law); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 36-9-38-1-33 (Michie Supp. 1995) (Municipal Improvement Districts); Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 386.1-386.14 (West 1995) (Self-Supported Municipal Improvement Districts); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1781-1793 (1991) (Business Improvement Districts); and Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33:4571 (West 1988) (Special Districts for Business Improvement).
See also Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 400, §§ 1-10, at 17-23 (West Supp. 1996)
(Business Improvement Districts); Michigan, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.1651-1680 (West 1995)
(Downtown Development Authority); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.090-. 1081 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1996) (Economic Development Authorities); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-43-101-133
(1996) (Business Improvement Districts); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 71.790-808 (Vernon 1987)
(Special Business Districts); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-12-1101-1151 (1993) (Business
Improvement Districts); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4015-4038 (1991) (Business Improvement
Districts); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:120-129 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (Central
Business Service Districts); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:56-65-89 (West 1992) (Special
Improvement Districts); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-63-1-16 (Michie Supp. 1996) (Business
Improvement Districts); and New York, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
See also North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-535-544 (1994) (Municipal Service Districts);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-22.01-22.14 (1995) (Special Assessment for Promotion of
Business Activity); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 715.69-.81 (West 1996) (Economic Development
Districts); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 223.144 (1994) (Economic Improvement Districts); Pennsylvania,
53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1551-1554 (West 1996) (Business Improvement Districts); South
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-37-20-180 (Law Co-op. 1994) (Municipal Improvement Act); South
Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 9-55-1-21 (1995) (Business Improvement Districts); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-84-101-530 (1992) (Central Business Improvement Districts); Texas, TEX. Loc.
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 375.001-375.281 (West Supp. 1996) (Municipal Management Districts); Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-401-414 (1991) (Parking and Business Improvement Districts); Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-239-249.1 (Michie 1989) (Assessment for Local Improvements); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35.87A.010-.170 (West Supp. 1996) (Parking and Business Improvement
Areas); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 8-13A-1-15 (1995) (Business Improvement Districts); and
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.608 (West 1990) (Business Improvement Districts).
62. For state statutes authorizing the assessment, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 50-2608 (1995); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:124 (1988 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 223.114 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 9-55-13 (1995).
63. Interview with Michael Smith, New York City Department of Business Services, Aug. 24,
1995, in New York, N.Y. [hereinafter Smith Interview]. Assessments are not generally allowed as tax
deductions. See Hudson, supra note 18, at 72. Some BIDs proponents, however, including New York
City Deputy Mayor John Dyson, have suggested that such payments should be tax deductible. See Smith
Interview, supra.
64. One California court recognized "a clear distinction between taxes, which are levied for general
revenue and general public improvements; and special assessments, which are levied for local
improvements which directly benefit specific real property." Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board
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federal courts have generally upheld the exercise of a special district's
assessment power.6 State constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting
delegation of the power to tax may, however, make levying of assessments by
the district impossible.6 The assessment amount is often quite small. In
Chicago, the assessment is less than 1% of the assessed valuation of the
property.67 While the New York statute allows the assessment to be as much
as 20% of the real estate taxes levied against the property,' in practice it is
often far less than 10% .69 In 1993, the total assessment levied by the Grand
Central Partnership amounted to only 12.4 cents per square foot,70 well below
10% of the property tax levied on the area.71
Despite the many indications that BIDs are doing their part to create a
cleaner and safer metropolis, "[tihe ultimate effects of BIDs for good or for ill
are yet to be seen."72 Part of the uncertainty springs from the difficulty of
weighing clear substantive goods like cleaner and safer streets against
procedural qualms about how BIDs operate. In any event, it is worth asking
whether improved sanitation, better security, increased property values, and a
more auspicious climate for business must be gained at the price of democracy
and accountability. Furthermore, these benefits are not usually enjoyed by all
of Supervisors, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 396 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing Spring St. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
148 P. 217 (Cal. 1915) ("'a special assessment is not, in the constitutional sense, a tax at all'")).
65. For cases upholding a district's power to assess, see, e.g., Maumelle Boulevard Water & Sewer
Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 868 S.W.2d 73 (Ark. 1993) (upholding district power to assess even where
payor's land had greatly decreased in value); Jensen v. City and County of Denver, 806 P.2d 381 (Colo.
1991) (sustaining power of BID to apply different assessment rates against state constitutional challenge).
Extraordinarily, a California Court of Appeal recently held that special assessments are not
prohibited by Proposition 13, California's tax relief amendment to the state constitution (Cal. Const.
Art. XIII A § 4): "The assessment on businesses for downtown promotion is not a true special
assessment. . . . Where the burden for these expenditures is borne by the group specifically benefitted
by them, Proposition 13 is not implicated." Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 607 (Ct.
App. 1992); see also Solvang, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (same).
Courts have rejected district assessment power only in cases where other statutes have specifically
created immunity for certain institutions. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis v. Metrocentre
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 657 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1981) (invalidating effort of Arkansas municipal
district to levy assessment on Federal Reserve Bank).
66. See WILLIAM D. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 98 (1992) (noting prohibition against
delegation of taxation function in constitutions of California, Colorado, South Dakota, Pennsylvania,
and Wyoming). Each of these states, however, has a BID law allowing the levying of special
assessments. See supra note 61; see also FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(a): "[S]pecial districts may be
authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be authorized by general law to levy taxes ....
Note that any proposed tax by Florida districts must show a public purpose it would fulfill. See Hudson,
supra note 18, at 74-75.
67. See Krohe, supra note 53, at *4.
68. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-k(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
69. See Smith Interview, supra note 63.
70. See Alan S. Oser, Spreading the Gospel oflmprovement Districts, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1993,
§ 10, at 8.
71. See Smith Interview, supra note 63.
72. Pack, supra note 27, at 21.
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parts of the city, but by a few wealthy commercial enclaves.73 Hence BIDs
may contribute more to separatism and the privatization of government than to
the common good.74 The next part of this Note will address these concerns.
II. AN EVALUATION OF NEW YORK STATE'S BID LAW
Although the New York State legislature passed a statute enabling the
creation of Business Improvement Districts in 1980, 71 much of the 1980s was
spent refining and improving the concept. The first district created under this
statute was the 14th Street-Union Square District, set up in 1984,76 when the
establishment of a district required a specific enabling act on the part of the
legislature.77 The reform of the law in 1990 eliminated this requirement78
and allowed districts to be created through a process of review requiring the
approval of the city planning commission, various community boards, the
borough president,79 the city council, 8" and the state comptroller.8' Failure
to follow such procedures could result in wholesale invalidation of the
district.8 2 While this procedure might seem overly onerous, opposing the
establishment of the district requires even more effort. To prevent a district
from being formed, the owners of more than half of the real property must
come forward and file an objection.83
73. See Doug Lasdon & Sue Halpern, When Neighborhoods Are Privatized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1995, at A29. Lasdon and Halpern note that other commentators have "extolled business districts, saying
that they 'may be the best hope of getting parts of America's cash-strapped cities working again.' The
operative word is 'parts.' Private government, ruled by the rich, is a dangerous concept."
74. As prominent local government law professor Gerald E. Frug commments, "'The privatization
of government in America is the most important thing that's happening, but we're not focused on it. We
haven't thought of it as government yet.'" Quoted in GARREAU, supra note 18, at 185.
75. See N.Y.C. DEP'T OF BUS. SERVS., STARTING AND MANAGING BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICTS 3 (1995) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter STARTING AND MANAGING] (stating that BID
law was signed in August 1981); STAFF REP. TO THE FIN. COMM., COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF N.Y.,
CITIES WITHIN CITIES: BuSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MICROPOLIS
5-6 (1995) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter CITIES WITHIN CITIES].
76. The BID was created through the effort of the heads of Consolidated Edison, Co., the Guardian
Life Insurance Company, and the New School for Social Research. See Douglas Martin, Districts to
Improve Business Proliferate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at B3.
77. See STARTING AND MANAGING, supra note 75, at 4.
78. See id. at 3-4.
79. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
80. See id. §§ 980-e, 980-f.
81. See id. § 980-g.
82. See, e.g., Hood v. Central Bus. Improvement Dist. No. 1, 781 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Ark. 1989)
(invalidating district because petitions for formation improperly signed). But see Downtown Palo Alto
Comm. for Fair Assessment v. City Council of Palo Alto, 225 Cal. Rptr. 559, 564 (Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that state law commands courts to "liberally construe the relevant notice requirements");
Fladung v. City of Boulder, 417 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1966) (holding that insufficient notice did not prevent
formation of street and sewer district as city council had power to act swiftly to serve public interest).
83. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-e(b). New York's statute is typical in this regard. In
California, those who will pay more than 50% of the total assessments must object. See CAL. STS. &
HIGH. CODE § 36625 (West Supp. 1996). In Arkansas, by contrast, owners of two-thirds of the property
in the district must petition to begin the process of creating the BID. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-184-
108 (Michie 1987).
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The most useful place to begin the critique of New York's BID law is with
its nondemocratic procedures for the management of the district. Pursuant to
state statute, owners of real property within the district are entitled to greater
representation on the Board of Directors than commercial or residential tenants.
A second interesting aspect of New York's BID law is its attempt to reconcile
this reliance upon wealth-based classifications with the status of BIDs as not-
for-profit entities. This status, and the obligation to serve the public good that
it entails, gives rise to a third area of difficulty with New York's BID law: its
lack of concern for the impact of BIDs on the broader municipal community.
This concern for the public welfare underlies a final objection to BIDs: Public
officials do not retain sufficient oversight over BID activities. These four
objections are the basis for the suggestions for revising and improving New
York's BID law in Part IV of this Note.
A. Are BIDs Undemocratic?
At the onset of the BID's development, primary responsibility for seeing
that the BID is up and running belongs to the District Management Association
(DMA). 4 The DMA is the specific entity with which the City Council
contracts for the provision of services in the district and the collection of
assessments to finance these expenses.' Once the BID is operating as an
ongoing entity, the District Management Association entrusts day-to-day
responsibility for the operation of the BID to a Board of Directors. 6 As this
Board is primarily responsible for the operation of the District, concerns about
democratic representation may properly be directed to this entity.' The most
prominent difficulties lie in how members of the Board of Directors are
selected. There are at least two areas in which New York's BID law employs
voting procedures which favor some groups at the expense of others and thus
seems inconsistent with democracy.
First, New York's BID statute raises some concerns in its allowance for
weighted voting to favor property owners. The relevant section provides that
the votes of board members who are owners of real property in the district may
be weighted to reflect the amount of property they own, up to granting a single
property owner one-third of the vote."8 Under this provision, owners of
84. See STARTING AND MANAGING, supra note 75, at 6.
85. See Smith Interview, supra note 63.
86. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-m, STARTING AND MANAGING, supra note 75, at 6 ("The
DMA Board of Directors is accountable to members of the general association and is responsible for
management of the day-to-day operation of the BID.").
87. Frequently there is significant overlap between membership on the DMA and the Board. See
Smith Interview, supra note 63.
88. The New York statute provides:
the certificate of incorporation or by-laws of such association shall provide ... that the votes
of members who are property owners be weighted in proportion to the assessment levied or
to be levied against properties in the district, provided that in no case shall the total number
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property within the district may form a powerful bloc effectively able to make
any and all decisions by either the District Management Association or the
Board of Directors. A separate provision establishes that owners of property
within the district shall always enjoy a majority on the Board of Directors.89
This section guarantees that representatives of owners of property within the
district shall constitute a majority on the Board whether or not the owners are
in fact superior in number to all other members of the district and whether or
not such owners actually live in the district.
The statutory requirement that owners of real property enjoy majority
representation on the Board of Directors seems inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the first invocation of the principle of "one person, one
vote" came a few years earlier,' Reynolds v. Sims 9' is widely understood
to have established this basic principle.' In striking down an apportionment
plan for the Alabama legislature which diluted the votes of some citizens based
on their place of residence, the Court emphasized its concern that, "[c]itizens,
not history or economic interests, cast votes. " 93 By guaranteeing property
owners a majority vote on the GCP's Board of Directors irrespective of their
number, the New York BID statute seems to violate this requirement. To
justify a departure from the basic "one person, one vote" principle, entities
such as BIDs must establish that they are so different in nature from other
quasi-governmental entities that this principle should not apply.
The Supreme Court has made clear that there is an exception to the Equal
Protection Clause94 for special assessment districts that are narrow in function
of votes assigned to any one such member or to any number of such members under common
ownership or control exceed thirty-three and one-third percent of the total number of votes
which may be cast.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-m(a).
89. This provision establishes:
The board of directors of the association shall be composed of representatives of owners and
tenants within the district, provided, however, that not less than a majority of its members
shall represent owners and provided further that tenants of commercial space and dwelling
units within the district shall also be represented on the board.
Id. § 980-m(b).
90. The phrase is Justice William 0. Douglas's, from his majority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (rejecting Georgia's weighted voting system for political primaries) ("The
conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address,
to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."). Justice Stewart employed similar language in his concurring opinion. See id. at 382 ("Within
a given constituency, there can be room for but a single constitutional rule-one voter, one vote."); see
also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (declaring failure of Georgia to reapportion legislature
violated equal protection) ("No right is more precious ... than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which ... we must live.").
91. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
92. See id. at 559.
93. Id. at 580. One text on special districts seems to concur: "Using property ownership as the
basic test for eligibility ignores the generally accepted concept of citizenship and residence as the
fundamental determinants." BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 250.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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and limited in effect. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Wter Storage
Districts' carves out an exception to Reynolds for a special assessment district
"by reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of
its activities on landowners as a group."96 The more explicit statement of the
distinction, however, came in Ball v. James,' in which the Court refused to
apply the Equal Protection Clause to elections for the board of directors of an
Arizona water reclamation district. First, the directors did not "administer such
normal functions of government as the maintenance of streets, the operation of
schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services,"98 and second, the "narrow
primary purpose for which the district is created"' insured that certain
burdens or benefits fell more on one group than another such that these
disparities could be reflected in the voting scheme.
As established under New York law, however, it seems questionable
whether BIDs can claim the immunity from the Equal Protection Clause created
by Salyer.'00 The district in Salyer was immune because its "limited purpose"
entailed "disproportionate effect" on some residents over others.' 0' The
95. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). Salyer answered the question, left unresolved in Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), of whether a "special purpose unit of government" may have election
procedures in violation of the principle of one person, one vote in recognition that its functions affected
"definable groups of constituents more than other constituents." 390 U.S. at 483-84.
96. 410 U.S. at 728. Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 U.S.
743 (1973), reached the same conclusion in rejecting a challenge to a special district in Wyoming. See
also Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875 (Cal. 1992) (transit district not in
violation of equal protection); Chesser v. Buchanan, 568 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1977) (tunnel district not in
violation of equal protection); State v. Frontier Acres Community Dev. Dist., 472 So. 2d 455 (Fla.
1985) (development district not in violation of equal protection).
But see Choudhry v. Free, 552 P.2d 438 (Cal. 1976) (irrigation district in violation of equal
protection); Burrey v. Embarcadero Mun. Improvement Dist., 488 P.2d 395 (Cal. 1971) (transit, police,
and fire district in violation of equal protection); Johnson v. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 584
P.2d 646 (Idaho 1978) (irrigation district in violation of equal protection); Lower Valley Water &
Sanitation Dist. v. Public Serv. Co., 632 P.2d 1170 (N.M. 1981) (sanitation and water district must
adhere to Reynolds standard).
97. 451 U.S. 355 (1981). Salyer and Ball released a torrent of commentary. See, e.g., William A.
Garton, One Person, One Vote in Special District Elections, 20 S.D. L. REv. 245 (1975) (recommend-
ing that equal protection clause should apply where functions served by district are governmental);
William H. Riker, Democracy and Representation: A Reconciliation of Ball v. James and Reynolds v.
Sims, 1 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 39 (1982) (exploring public policy implications of requiring adherence
to one person, one vote principle); Note, Ball v. James and the Rational Basis Test: An Exception to
the One Person-One Vote Rule, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 721 (1982) (maintaining that Ball was correctly
decided because democratic interests not at stake in water district elections); Note, Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water District: Opening the Floodgates in Local Special Government Elections, 72
MICH. L. REv. 868 (1974) (approving decision in Salyer but wary of potential misapplication of Salyer's
logic).
98. 451 U.S. at 366.
99. Id. at 369.
100. In Florida, the relevant statute provides for a period of temporary immunity from equal
protection challenge. Depending on the size of the district, elections need not be based on the principle
of one person, one vote for the first six or ten years. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 190.006(3)(a)2.a and
§ 190.003(16) (Harrison 1993).
101. 410 U.S. at 728. The district court reasoned from this that multipurpose districts could not
be exempt from Equal Protection scrutiny. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144, 146 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The Salyer district "performs no governmental
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functions of New York BIDs, however, are far from specialized. The statute
creating BIDs allows them to serve a wide variety of functions, including
landscaping, planting trees, setting up parks, constructing lighting and heating
facilities, enhancing security, widening streets, rehabilitating or renovating
existing properties, constructing garages or other parking facilities, setting up
booths, kiosks, benches, holiday decorations, and providing sanitation
services.'02 Most special assessment districts perform only one of these
functions. The districts held to be exempt from the requirements of the one
person, one vote principle in Salyer and Ball, for example, had no other
purpose than water reclamation and storage. °3 As the sole index of benefit
and service from the district was the amount of water used by its members,
correlating service levels with political control was a straightforward
affair. °1 Precisely the opposite is true with respect to the New York BIDs,
which function more as substitute governments for the area rather than as
specific service providers.
Perhaps the broader principle to be distilled from the Court's distinction in
Salyer and Ball is that where the impact of the decisions made by a governing
board has a general and nonquantifiable effect on those living in the affected
district, the principle of one person, one vote must shape the voting proce-
dure. 1 5 In a similar case, the Tenth Circuit held that the statutory system of
electing Kansas's State Board of Agriculture by delegates from private
functions of general concern to the public ... such as found by the court in Burrey v. Embarcadero
Municipal Improvement District..." 342 F. Supp. at 146. In that case, the California Supreme Court
held that a district that accorded "extraordinarily more voting strength to some of the district's voters
than to others" violated the rule of one person, one vote established by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Burrey v. Embarcadero Mun. Improvement Dist., 488 P.2d 395, 396 (Cal. 1971). The Burrey district
"construct[ed] and maintain[ed] street lighting and facilities for sewage and garbage disposal, drainage,
reclamation, water treatment and distribution... maintain[ed] a fire department and police force [and]
create[d] parks and recreational facilities." 488 P.2d at 397.
102. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c (McKinney Supp. 1996). For state statutes creating
districts with similarly broad powers, see CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36610 (West Supp. 1996); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 21-43-105(d) (1996); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.091-094 (West Supp. 1996);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-84-301 (1992).
103. See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728-29 (the district's "primary purpose .. . is to provide for the
acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming . .. . It provides no other general public
services . . . "); Ball, 451 U.S. at 357 ("the primary purposes of the District have always been the
storage, delivery, and conservation of water.").
104. See Recent Developments, Voting-Property Qualifications for Voting in Special Purpose
Districts: Beyond the Scope of "One Man-One Vote", 59 CORNELL L. REv. 687, 694-95 (1974) ("[It
was not difficult to recognize that landowners within the district had overwhelming interests in the
successful operation of the district while the interests of other residents was correspondingly remote.").
On the other hand, water is a critical human necessity, access to which is not exactly a "remote"
concern. See, e.g., GARREAU, supra note 18, at 193 ("In the dry Southwest, water is the linchpin of
the universe.").
105. Another way to understand these rulings could be that the equality of "interest" between voters
in a special assessment district should preclude vote dilution. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball,
and Holt: Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1982) (arguing that Salyer was correctly decided on this basis, but Ball and Holt
were not).
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agricultural associations violated the Equal Protection Clause.'06 The court
based its reasoning on the extent of the Board's powers: "ranging ...from
regulating the healthfulness of milk and meat sold in the state to generally
regulating all weights and measures, including those commercially used by
entities outside the agricultural industry.""' 7 The Equal Protection Clause
applies even if the duties of the body in question are administrative. 08 As the
general power of the Board affects a variety of district members in a number
of ways, control over who exercises this power cannot be vested in a minority
of voters.
The classification of voters made by New York's BID law, moreover, is
premised upon property ownership. Although laws denying the right to vote
based on property ownership have long been dispensed with,109 and were last
a hot political issue during Dorr's Rebellion in 1844,1 modern-day property
limitations upon the franchise have only recently been eliminated. Within the
post-Reynolds framework, classifications among voters predicated on property
ownership or lack thereof have consistently failed to satisfy the demands of
equal protection. The Court applied the Reynolds rule to the election of trustees
of a junior college in Hadley v. Junior College District.. because those
trustees "exercised general governmental powers" and "perform[ed] important
governmental functions" which affected all those residing in the district,
whether or not they had any other association with the college besides living
in the district."2 Restriction of the franchise to property owners in municipal
bond elections is equally impermissible,' as well as requiring ownership of
land to vote in an election on municipal reorganization.14 Hence the view of
"interest" seemingly espoused by the Court is actually quite extensive.
Moreover, the fact that the New York BID statute significantly dilutes the votes
of certain residents of the district rather than excludes such individuals entirely
106. See Hellebust v. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 1994); see also cases cited supra note
96.
107. 42 F.3d at 1334.
108. See Cunningham v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885, 888 (W.D. Wash.
1990) ("It does not matter whether the governmental powers possessed be deemed 'legislative' or
administrative'; if the body possessing them is elected, the one person, one vote principle applies.").
109. Such exclusions "had been largely eliminated by the middle of the nineteenth century."
MARCHEITE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850,
at 311-12 (1969).
110. For a brief history of the insurrection and the suffrage issues which partially caused the
rebellion, see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1849).
111. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
112. Id. at 53-54.
113. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204
(1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
114. See, e.g., Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.
1978); Pierce v. Village of Ossining, 292 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that town's
exclusion of non-property owners from referendum on municipal reorganization was "invidious
discrimination.").
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cannot serve as a defense. In Reynolds, the Court emphasized that "the right
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of
the franchise."115 Differential representation based on property ownership,
therefore, must be met with the same skepticism as absolute denial of
representation.116 Challenges to weighted voting procedures for a special
assessment district have been rejected only where the district's functions were
so narrow and specialized as to fall under the rubric of Salyer.11 7 As already
demonstrated, the functions of New York BIDs envisioned by the statute seem
neither so limited nor narrow to qualify under this exemption.
In sum, the Equal Protection Clause does not require application of the one
person, one vote principle for districts specialized in purpose, narrow in scope,
and limited in effect. As the BIDs set up by New York statute are none of
these, such districts seem to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The reason
this statute is not clearly unconstitutional, however, is likely that these
"business improvement districts," the aim of which is to earn a profit, are
incorporated as nonprofits and thus are able, under New York law, to create
classes of voters differentially represented on the Board of Directors. The next
Section discusses this seemingly anomalous status.
B. Are BIDs Appropriately Viewed as Nonprofit Corporations?
Although the basic structure of BIDs created pursuant to New York law
seems to violate the Equal Protection Clause, there is one major reason most
BIDs would be immune from such scrutiny: by statute BIDs can be incorporat-
ed as nonprofit"1 entities and exempt from the requirement of one person,
one vote. This Section will ask, however, whether this designation is
appropriate in light of the fact that the ultimate aim of BIDs is to increase
profits to its members. To explore these issues fully, this Section will first
examine the nonprofit status of BIDs in relation to potential tax exemptions and
then discuss the impact of this nonprofit status on BIDs' voting procedures. As
the following discussion indicates, BIDs might be able to qualify as nonprofits
115. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
116. As the Court held in Hadley, "a qualified voter has a constitutional right to vote in elections
without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted." 397 U.S. at 52; see also Board of
Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (holding that New York City's Board of Estimate represented
unconstitutional vote dilution); Jackson v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (same in context of county election). For a discussion of vote dilution in the context
of racial discrimination, see Katharine I. Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Election
Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851 (1982).
117. See, e.g., Burris v. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 147, 743 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Ark. 1990).
118. Note that the difference between "nonprofit" and "not-for-profit" is purely a matter of
emphasis. A "nonprofit" organization can earn profits; it simply does not exist for that purpose alone.
The "not-for-profit" designation clarifies this point. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
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under some, but not all, tax-exempt categories of § 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code. The possibility that certain BID board members could use the
district to enrich themselves, however, raises serious problems no matter which
specific tax-exempt provision is relied upon. Second, the statutory blessing
given to the BID's undemocratic voting procedures is at odds with broader
principles of state not-for-profit law.
The fact that a "business improvement district," whose very name seems
to connote a profit-making purpose, may qualify as a nonprofit corporation
attests to the expansiveness of New York's nonprofit corporation law. There
are two basic aims of nonprofit corporation law: to ensure that the nonprofit
serves a charitable purpose and to ensure that the profits or earnings of the
corporation are not distributed to those who exercise control over it." 9 One
commentator calls the latter concern the "nondistribution constraint," yet notes
that this does not mean the corporation may not earn a profit, only that the
profit may not then be distributed to those running the corporation.120 In
practice, these two questions are intertwined as one seeks to determine who
benefits from an organization's work.
Since its revision in 1970, New York's nonprofit statute has been criticized
for its confusing attempt to categorize nonprofit organizations. One commenta-
tor calls the New York statute "a distinctly novel approach to nonprofit
incorporation" about which there is much to say that is "negative."' 2' The
New York statute sets up four different types of nonprofits. The most relevant
section here describes Type B corporations as those formed for any of the
following purposes: "charitable, educational, religious, scientific, literary,
cultural, or for the prevention of cruelty to animals."122 This language
specifically tracks the language of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code to qualify presumptively Type B corporations for a federal tax exemp-
tion."'23 Other sections of the law specify that Type A corporations may be
formed for nonbusiness purposes, including certain non-pecuniary activities as
"civic, patriotic, political, social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural, horticultural,
animal husbandry, and for a professional, commercial, industrial, trade or
119. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497,
501 (1981). This is also called the "inurement" problem, and was most recently addressed in great
length in Internal Revenue Service General Counsel Memorandum 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
120. See Hansmann, supra note 119, at 501. As Hansmann's main argument is that "the essential
role of the nonprofit organization is to serve as a fiduciary for its patrons in situations of contract
failure," id. at 508-09, it is not entirely clear how he would view BIDs. Unlike most nonprofit
corporations, the operators and beneficiaries are the same people.
121. Hansmann, supra note 119, at 530, 531. Hansmann is generally hostile to the notion of
categorizing nonprofits. See id. at 580-99. But see Note, New York's Not-for-Profit Corporation Law,
47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 791 (1972) (calling statute "carefully drafted and thoroughly considered law,
reflecting a reasoned, but idealistic legislative approach").
122. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 1970).
123. Compare N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) with I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1996). See
also Hansmann, supra note 119, at 531.
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service association." 24 In contrast to the specific language of the Type A and
Type B statute, Type C corporations "may be formed for any lawful business
purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objective."" z This
provision allows the creation of a nonprofit "for a purpose normally carried on
by business corporations for profit."' 26 Finally, Type D is simply "a
connector to other special-purpose statutes" 127 and is not of concern here.
The essential characteristic of a not-for-profit under New York State Not-
For-Profit Corporation Law is "that such organizations do not exist for the
pursuit of the self-interest of their members in a proprietary or pecuniary
sense." 2  In general, New York courts have taken care to police this
constraint. 29 For at least a half-century, New York courts have enjoined
putatively nonprofit entities from conducting certain profit-maximizing
activities: an association to secure composers' rights to their "serious music"
could not claim it was a nonprofit because composers profited from the rights
to their music; 30 an organization dedicated to the lease and sale of real
property was properly denied certification as a nonprofit because such activity
"can only be considered a business purpose";' and a trade association for
real estate brokers could not operate a nonprofit property listing service for the
benefit of its members, who would profit from selling the houses.3 2 Finally,
at least one New York court has made clear that a § 501(c)(3) exemption does
not necessarily mean that a corporation is a type B nonprofit,'33 decoupling
the tax exemption and this status. 3
4
An examination of IRS policy also indicates that the preferred § 501(c)(3)
designation is inappropriate for BIDs even if they qualify as Type B nonprofits
in New York State. The IRS makes its own determination, and federal tax law
strongly suggests that entities such as BIDs are ineligible for a tax exemption
under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, although the slightly less
124. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 1970).
125. Id. § 201(b).
126. Id., comment to § 201.
127. Hansmann, supra note 119, at 531.
128. 6 WHITE, N.Y. CORPS. 611.01 (13th ed. 1995).
129. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 204 provides that a nonprofit corporation "shall conduct
no activities for pecuniary profit or financial gain, whether or not in furtherance of its corporate
purposes, except to the extent that such activity supports its other lawful activities then being
conducted."
130. See Kubik v. American Composers Alliance, 54 N.Y.S.2d 764, 764 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Note
that under the earlier version of New York nonprofit law, the ACA could not claim it was a
membership corporation." Id. at 768.
131. Bodell v. Ghezzi, 375 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1975).
132. See Santos v. Chappell, 318 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
133. See Bodell, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 428 ("the fact that such activities have been approved by the
Internal Revenue Service for tax exemption is not considered conclusive").
134. See Hansmann, supra note 119, at 532.
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desirable exemption under § 501(c)(4) may still be open to them. 35 In 1975,
for example, the IRS denied a § 501(c)(3) exemption to a block associa-
tion, 136 even though its aim was "to preserve and beautify that block, to
improve all public facilities within the block, and to prevent physical
deterioration of the block."'37 The IRS explained:
By enhancing the value of the roadway sections abutted by property of its members,
the organization is enhancing the value of its members' property rights. The
restricted nature of its membership and the limited area in which its improvements
are made, indicate that the organization is organized and operated to serve the
private interests of its members .... Accordingly, although the organization is
primarily engaged in promoting the general welfare of the community, it is not
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. Therefore, it does not
qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code.138
The IRS did allow an exemption, however, under § 501(c)(4) of the Code. 139
The fact that a block association, whose increased property values are likely
small compared to the profits reaped by a BID, does not qualify for § 501(c)(3)
status strongly suggests that BIDs should not either. A second ruling reached
a similar result in addressing the status of a commercial improvement district
in 1977, holding that an organization whose purpose was "to revive retail sales
in an area suffering from continued economic decline,""'4 did not qualify for
a § 501(c)(3) exemption.'14  The reason was that "the activities of the
organization... result in major benefits accruing to the stores that will locate
within the shopping center. "142 The inurement of benefits to members of the
organization, therefore, strongly militates against § 501(c)(3) status.
Faced with the relatively stringent approach taken by New York courts and
the IRS in ensuring that § 501(c)(3) nonprofits refrain from profit-maximizing
135. There is an important distinction between qualifying as a § 501(c)(3) nonprofit and qualifying
as another § 501(c) nonprofit. All § 501(c) organizations are exempt from federal income taxation, but
only § 501(c)(3) organizations allow contributors to deduct their contributions for purposes of
determining their federal income tax liability. Section § 501(c)(3) specifies that "religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes... or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual..." shall be exempt from federal taxation. Section 501(c)(3) is thus the most
sought-after designation, as "contributions of cash or property (but not services) to these charitable
groups are deductible by individuals and corporations for income tax purpose (under § 170 of the Code)
and are also deductible for estate and gift tax purposes (under §§ 2055, 2522)." John G. Simon, The
Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in JAMESJ. FISHMAN
& STEPHEN SCHWARZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 309, 310 (1995).
136. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210.
137. Id. at 210.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 211.
140. Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 144, at 144-45.
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activity benefit, it is unclear why BIDs should enjoy this status. In contrast to
other states' statutes which specifically invoke public welfare justifications for
BID legislation,' 43 the New York legislature simply cited the need for "an
effective means for restoring and promoting business activity" in creating
BIDs. ' Furthermore, New York's statute allows BIDs to incorporate as
Type B nonprofits. 45 As the language characterizing Type B corporations is
exactly the same as § 501(c)(3), this creates a presumptive exemption from
taxation under § 501(c)(3), a benefit conferred because Type B organizations
are "expected in some way to serve the public."146 While an exemption from
taxation may be good policy for those entities who serve charitable purposes,
why taxpayers should subsidize the activities of an organization whose goal is
to improve business and increase their own profits is difficult to discern.
Furthermore, it seems impossible to police the nondistribution constraint,
intended to prohibit benefits from accruing to those operating the BID, when
the very aim of a BID is to increase its own members' profits. Problems of
inurement of organizational resources to private good arise "where the financial
benefit represents a transfer of the organization's financial resources to an
individual solely by virtue of the individual's relationship with the organiza-
tion."1"7 This prohibition prompts a closer look at "persons who, because of
their particular relationship with an organization, have an opportunity to
control or influence its activities,"148 or in other words, whether a conflict
of interest exists. Yet inurement problems exist not simply when a few people
at the top profit, but when the entity as a whole serves as a vehicle for private
enrichment in the guise of social welfare: "an organization must establish that
it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as ...
143. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-184-103(3) (Michie 1987) ("The elimination of urban blight
and decay and the modernization and general improvement of central business districts by governmental
action are considered necessary to promote the public health, safety, and welfare of the communi-
ties . . . ."); CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36601(b) (West Supp. 1996) ("It is in the public interest to
promote the economic revitalization and physical maintenance of the business districts of its cities in
order to create jobs, attract new businesses, and prevent the erosion of the business districts."); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 7-84-102 (1992) (citing "the elimination of urban blight and decay"). Other states,
however, seem to invoke a more clearly profit-oriented justification. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
22, § 1501(2) (Supp. 1994) ("The availability of enhanced municipal services ... serve as a magnet
to the consuming public ...").
144. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW, comment following § 980, at 130 (McKinney Supp. 1996). The
legislature merely alluded to "the economic and general well-being of the people of the state." Id.
145. See, e.g., Certification of Incorporation of the Grand Central Partnership (copy on file with
author). This status seems just as anomalous as the designation of a BID as a nonprofit. Examples of
Type A nonprofits include Boards of Trade or Chambers of Commerce, which seem far closer to the
purpose of a BID than Type B nonprofits. Type B nonprofits include cemetery associations, associations
to prevent cruelty to animals, historical societies, and soldier's monument corporations. See 14 N.Y.
JUR.2D, BusiNEss RELATIONSHIPS § 60, at 140-41 (1996).
146. Note, supra note 121, at 777.
147. IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 20 (Nov. 22, 1991).
148. Id. at 17-18.
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shareholders of the organization." 149 A New York City Council report has
noted that many of the BIDs currently operating in New York City seem
plagued by conflicts of interest and are in danger of becoming "cash cows for
other organizations." "o
The nonprofit designation is important for a second reason: it links the BID
law to a provision of the not-for-profit law insulating such entities from an
equal protection challenge to their voting procedures. The New York BID
statute provides that the district management association may have different
classes of voters, pursuant to the not-for-profit corporation law.' The same
section also provides, as described above, that owners of property in the
district are entitled to a vote weighted in proportion to the amount of property
they own.5 2 These sections of the BID law rely on provisions of the
nonprofit corporation law that provide that voting may be by class,' and
that entire classes of members may be denied a vote:' 54 the BID statute
explicitly exempts BIDs from compliance with section 611 of the nonprofit
corporation law which requires that, "[i]n any case in which a member is
entitled to vote, he shall have no more than, nor less than, one vote . . . ." "
Yet the exemption created by the BID statute eviscerates an important principle
of nonprofit corporation law, that "a corollary to the absence of proprietary
interest is the presence of a right to participate in the uses and administration
of power on a broad and democratic basis." 5 6 Hence "there can be no class
149. Id. at 31.
150. CITIES WITHIN CITIES, supra note 75, at 32.
151. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-m(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996) provides that, "There shall be a
district management association for each district established pursuant to the provision of this article
(which shall pursuant to the not-for-profit corporation law have one or more classes of membership,
voting or non-voting) ...."
152. The certificate of incorporation of a BID "may provide that the votes of members who are
property owners be weighted in proportion to the assessment levied or to be levied against the properties
within the district. . ." Id. § 980-m(a).
153. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPS. LAW § 616(a) (McKinney 1970) provides as follows: "The
certificate of incorporation or the by-laws may contain provisions specifying that any class or class of
members shall vote as a class... "
154. Id. § 612 provides that: "The certificate of incorporation or bylaws may provide, either
absolutely or contingently, that the members of any class shall not be entitled to vote . . . ." This
provision, however, is employed only in limited instances. For example, a volunteer fire company is
free to adopt bylaws which provide that "only firemen who attend at least 15 percent of all fire calls
during the year may vote in an election of line officers of the fire company," and that "they attend at
least three meetings annually." Comment to § 612, at 60 (Supp. 1996) (citations omitted).
155. Id. § 611 (e). The statute creates an exception for member organizations. Id. The BID statute
provides that, "Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of paragraph (e) of section six hundred
eleven of the not-for-profit corporation law," weighted voting is permissible. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§ 980-m(a).
156. WHITE, supra note 128, 156, at 611.01. Or, as one New York Supreme Court put it,
"[slince the primary objective of a not-for-profit corporation is not to generate a return on invested
capital, power is more appropriately shared between members on an equivalent basis, rather than on the
degree of investment." Roxbury Estates, Inc. v. Roxbury Run Village Association, Inc., 526 N.Y.S.2d
633, 636 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1988) (holding that owner of 130 lots was limited to single vote under
nonprofit corporation law).
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in which voting rights are other than equal."157 By weighting the votes of
owners of property within the district, the New York BID statute sharply
conflicts with this provision.
New York's BID statute, in short, creates organizations which may avail
themselves of all the advantages of nonprofits such as the exemption from
taxation, but none of the obligations, such as compliance with the principle of
one person, one vote. BIDs clearly are not § 501(c)(3) entities; a more
appropriate status would be § 501(c)(4) or § 501(c)(6), which specifically
includes "[b]usiness leagues [and] chambers of commerce."158 While the tax
advantages are not so large from the BID's standpoint in that no deductions
would be allowed for contributions made to it, 59 preserving the principles
of nonprofit corporation law is a more important goal. When such departures
from the larger legal framework occur, they should be based on a sober
evaluation of the good such a departure might detail. A subsequent section of
this Note will assess whether the Grand Central Partnership BID has used this
status to effect public good, or whether this status has served as a vehicle for
exploitation. "
C. Should BIDs Be Able to Affect City Residents Without Giving Them a
Vote?
A third problem with the New York BID statute is the remarkably low level
of broader public involvement in the creation and management of these entities.
Although it seems clear that BIDs may have a variety of effects, many of them
quite negative, on the rest of the municipality, the general public is largely
without a voice in the creation and ongoing operation of these districts. These
157. WHrTE, supra note 128, 156, at 1611.01. Courts have applied these provisions with alacrity.
In Procopio v. Fisher, 443 N.Y.S.2d 492 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1981), the court cited a long string of
cases to support the claim that each member of a nonprofit organization was entitled to one vote, see
443 N.Y.S.2d at 495, thereby preventing a residential association from allocating one vote for each
subdivided lot owned by a member. See also Roxbury Estates, 526 N.Y.S.2d 633.
158. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). To qualify under § 501(c)(4), an organization must be "primarily engaged
in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of people in the community. An
organization embraced within this section is one which is operated primarily for the purpose of bringing
about civic betterments and social improvements." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (a)(2) (1996). As the aim
of a Business Improvement District is to improve business, however, § 501(c)(6) seems a closer fit: such
an organization is
of the same general class as a chamber of commerce or a board of trade. Thus, its activities
should be directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business
as distinguished from the performance of the performance of particular services for individual
persons. An organization whose purpose is to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily
carried on forprofit, even though the business is conducted on a cooperative basis orproduces
only sufficient income to be self-sustaining, is not a business league.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1996) (emphasis added). As the last sentence indicates, it is possible that
BIDs do not qualify under any of the § 501(c) categories for tax exemption, either on their own income
or on contributions.
159. See supra note 135.
160. See infra Section M.B.
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considerations do not seem to fatally undermine the statute. However, they call
into question the wisdom of the choices made by the legislature. Since these
choices are largely policy issues, intervention by courts appears to be an
unlikely path to reform.
While tenants or property owners within a business improvement district
may report that their sales are up, spirits are high, and streets are prettier, the
impact of such districts on the rest of the city is less benign. As two analysts
contend: "We end up with a parochial clash between the city as a whole and
the neighborhood and the special district. Rather than promoting the good of
the entire city, the special district and its neighborhood associations frequently
succumb to the NIMBY ("Not In My Backyard") syndrome."61 Former
Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich situates this clash in the context of the
"secession of the successful,"62 which for Reich means the exodus of
"symbolic analysts," 63 highly paid professionals and consultants, from the
public sphere. Reich explains:
[P]ublic funds have been applied in earnest to downtown "revitalization" projects,
entailing the construction of clusters of postmodern office buildings... multilevel
parking garages, hotels with glass-enclosed atriums rising twenty stories or higher,
upscale shopping plazas and gallerias, theaters, convention centers, and luxury
condominiums. . . . The fortunate symbolic analyst is thankfully able to shop,
work, and attend the theater without risking direct contact with the outside
world-in particular, the other city."6
In one sense, a BID is the opposite of an enterprise zone:6 - While the latter
is intended to improve the prospects of the poorest city neighborhoods," 6
BIDs inevitably tend to serve wealthy areas. A BID will generally not be
created without a sufficient tax base, 67 and funding improvements for the
161. BABCOCK & LARSEN, supra note 34, at 143.
162. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine),
at 16.
163. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST- CENTURY
CAPITALISM 177-80 (1991).
164. Id. at 270-7 1.
165. See supra Section I.A.
166. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1993)
(arguing that tax incentives are insufficient to lift poor districts from poverty); Cisneros, supra note 13
(arguing, inter alia, for enterprise zones to reduce poverty and isolation of inner cities); Barry M. Rubin
& Margaret G. Wilder, Urban Enterprise Zones: Employment Impacts and Fiscal Incentives, 55 AM.
PL. ASS'N J. 418 (1989) (concluding that enterprise zones are cost-effective and job-creating
development tools); David Williams II, The Enterprise Zones Concept at the Federal Level: Are
Proposed Tax Incentives the Needed Ingredient?, 9 VA. TAX REV. 711 (1990) (recommending larger
tax breaks for enterprise zone legislation); Williams & Sander, supra note 13, at 2042-47.
167. See STARTING AND MANAGING, supra note 75, at 2 ("A BID usually works best in retail,
commercial, and industrial areas where ... [t]he tax base is sufficient to generate the revenue
needed."); Smith Interview, supra note 63.
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district requires that businesses within the district be able to afford additional
assessments.
The creation of a BID impinges upon the ability of a city to provide for its
less wealthy areas in at least three ways. First, the voluntary assessment agreed
to by district residents to fund their own services decreases their willingness
to tolerate other taxes: "'If we let everyone retreat into their little domains,
how much sharing is there going to be? . . . We could see more and more
opposition to general tax increases.'"' 68 The fear is that wealthy BIDs will
focus their energies on their own immediate area and ignore the broader
municipal picture to become "pacified and wealthy hamlets amidst the urban
jungle. " 69 Reich agrees: "The pattern is familiar. With each sought-after
reduction in their taxes, symbolic analysts in effect withdraw their dollars from
the support of public spaces shared by all and dedicate their savings to private
spaces .. "70 Second, the BID statute itself contains a provision specifying
that "[t]he district charge so levied shall be included in the total amount, if
any, that the municipality is permitted by law to raise in that year by a tax on
real property. "17' Hence the assessments so raised by BIDs for the sole
benefit of their part count against the ability of the city to raise revenue for the
whole. Third, the statute also allows BIDs to inhibit municipal efforts to fund
improvements by enabling BIDs to issue their own bonds, 172 and thereby
compete with the city on the bond market.
Given the possibility that BIDs may adversely affect the interests of city
dwellers, one might think that urban populations deserve some sort of vote on
the formation or continuing operation of a BID. Yet while the statute provides
for hearings before the affected community boards and the City Council in
168. Dale Russakoff, Businesses Take on City Hall's Dirty Work; Private Interests Pick up Slack
as Public Services Dwindle, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1991, at Al (quoting Janet Pack, see supra note
27).
169. Howard Wolfson, New York Bets on BIDs, METROPOLIS, Apr. 1992, at 15, 21.
170. Reich, supra note 163, at 268. These conflicts were partially responsible for the consolidation
of the Chicago water districts discussed earlier. An inquiry in 1933 found that there had been
"disintegration in control... and gross inequalities." BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 136.
171. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-k(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996). For example, assume that the city
may raise one million dollars through property taxes. If the total BID assessment equals $250,000, the
city's property tax ceiling drops from one million to $750,000.
172. See id. § 980-j(c). This section provides that, "Any municipality which has been established
pursuant to this Article, may, for the purpose of providing funds for making capital improvements
within a district, issue and sell bonds or other municipal obligations as provided in the local finance law
and other applicable laws and statutes." For similar provisions in other state statutes, see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 190.016 (Harrison 1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/27-45 (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 125.1666 (West Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-63-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); TEX. LOC.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.201 (West Supp. 1996).
One response to this fear is that a city will simply decide not to allow a BID to issue bonds when
doing so would create undue competition. However, as described infra at Subsection III.B.3, BIDs'
bonds may also enable a city to concentrate and attract investment to its wealthiest areas to the detriment
of more needy areas. While city mayors are certainly within their discretion to adopt trickle-down
economics, this provision allows them to do so in a circuitous manner and creates competition for their
own bonds, both of which add up to bad policy.
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which interested parties may advance arguments for and against a proposed
BID, only City Council and community board members in which the district
is to be created are actually granted a vote.' 73 The degree to which the
average city resident has any control over the potentially negative effects of
BIDs is minimal; only through voting for City Council members and other
officials, in elections in which the status of BIDs is quite unlikely to be the sole
issue, do residents outside the district have any say over the formation and
conduct of BIDs.
A legal challenge to the relative disempowerment of city residents,
however, would likely fail. The reason is that the state's legislative power
conclusively encompasses the ability to create separate cities, towns, and
districts. The classic case establishing the broad power of the legislature to do
virtually anything it wants in the area of district creation is the 1907 case
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,"74 usually cited for the proposition that "[tihe
number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon [municipal]
corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the
absolute discretion of the State." 75 In New York, the presumptively valid
legislative power has been used to justify broad impositions on the rights of
voteless citizens. In City of New York v. State of New York,' 76 the New York
Court of Appeals held that the passage of a law by the New York State
legislature allowing the likely secession of Staten Island from New York City
did not amount to "State interference in New York City property, affairs or
government, "'77 and so did not require a home rule message. As a result,
New York City voters were deprived of a voice in the potential deannexation
of one of their boroughs despite the significant effects this might cause. If the
legislature can enable the secession of Staten Island, the creation even of a
vaguely separate BID is well within its power. 78
The plenary power of the legislature to create special districts seems
immune from the argument that the affected residents deserve some vote in the
process. Federal courts have been unreceptive to the claim that the impact of
the creation of a district should give affected residents some voice in deciding
173. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(c).
174. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
175. Id. at 178.
176. 562 N.E.2d 118 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).
177. Id. at 120.
178. One way to distinguish the two situations, however, is that the creation of a BID involves
delegation of governmental power to a private entity, which recommends greater caution and scrutiny.
New York Community Board 5 member Nicholas Fish points out: "'There is a principled issue of
transferring control of pure public space to private entities .... This whole BID movement represents
experiments in privatization. They raise pretty fundamental policy questions which people ought to
ponder carefully.'" Quoted in Tom Gallagher, Trespasser on Main St. (You!), NATION, Dec. 18, 1995,
at 787, 790.
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whether such a district should be created. Moorman v. Wbod,1 79 for example,
involved a Kentucky annexation statute, under which an annexation could
proceed if a majority in the annexing city as well as a majority in the portion
of the unincorporated territory to be annexed approved the proposal. Voters in
the unincorporated territory that was not to be annexed sued, claiming that the
loss of a part of their territory to a nearby city would clearly affect them. The
court took note of several law review articles which point out that "it is
impractical, if not impossible, to find some manner in which everyone who has
a substantial stake in the outcome of an election, residents or non-residents
alike, may be permitted to vote" " and upheld the annexation statute."8'
The problem of effects might be solved if those people negatively affected by
BIDs simply registered their dissatisfaction in their votes for City Council or
State Legislature."s As Justice White wrote in the majority opinion to the
companion case to Salyer: "The statute authorizing the establishment of
improvement districts was enacted by a legislature in which all of the State's
electors have the unquestioned right to be fairly represented. "83 The fact that
a statute was enacted by a popularly elected legislature cannot make it
presumptively constitutional. Courts have indicated extreme unwillingness,
however, to analyze critically the creation of special districts.
Finally, it should be noted in passing that another source of challenge to the
operation of BIDs is that an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power has
taken place. There are some very rare cases in which judicial review has
rebuked legislative authority to create a special district.' There are also
cases in which the state constitution bars the legislature from delegating certain
179. 504 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
180. Id. at 476 (citing Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1571,
1609 (1975), and Note, Annexation Elections and the Right to Vote, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1093 (1973)).
181. 504 F. Supp. at 471. A virtually identical statute to the Kentucky law at issue in Wood was
sustained against an equal protection challenge in St. Louis County v. City of Town and Country, 590
F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1984), and Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.
1970) (allowing annexation when landowners of more than 50% of territory to be annexed voted for
annexation). The analysis in Adams, however, concentrated more on a contiguity requirement than the
property ownership requirement.
182. Alternatively, preexisting state constitutional provisions may enable affected voters to
challenge secession or annexation. In Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977),
the United States Supreme Court upheld Article IX § 1 (h)(1) of the New York State Constitution, which
required that any change in the distribution of powers between cities and the rest of a county be
approved by majorities both within and outside the borders of the cities so benefitted, even if this meant
that the vote of a county minority would outweigh the vote of an urban majority. See 430 U.S. at 271.
183. Associated Enters. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 744 (1973). If this
is the case, however, it is far from clear how any limit may be placed on the power of the legislature.
184. State v. Town of Lake Placid, 147 So. 468 (Fla. 1933), for example, annulled a legislative
establishment of a town because the court felt the act had created a resort village rather than recognized
an already existing entity: "the scheme was one to build an attractive pleasure and health resort, not for
persons already living within the area, but for persons who might be drawn thither by the alluring
prospects of play grounds and elegant clubs .... but that is for private industry and not for legislation
under the guise of establishing municipalities." Id. at 472.
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powers, such as taxation.8' In general, however, "'[tlhe frequent attempts
to vitiate legislation aimed at solving metropolitan area problems, by claiming
an unconstitutional delegation has taken place, have met with notable lack of
success.'" 186 Challenging the actual assessment, moreover, runs up against
the principle of legislative supremacy. As articulated by Justice Holmes: "The
amount of benefit which an improvement will confer upon particular land,
indeed whether it is a benefit at all, is a matter of forecast and estimate. In its
general aspects, at least, it is peculiarly a thing to be decided by those who
make the law . . "187 In sum, giving residents of areas affected by BIDs
some sort of vote may be good policy, but a choice that rests within the
political discretion of the legislature.
D. Do BIDs Require More Accountability?
A final weakness of the entities established by New York's BID law is the
lack of oversight powers the statute vests in local government as well as in
district residents. This flaw is a common problem with special districts; one
authority writing in the 1960s commented that, " [o]ne serious argument against
[special districts] is the inability of the public to exert adequate control over
them." 18 8 This lack of accountability creates a number of problems. Apart
from the inherent difficulty of coordinating services, usually a more significant
problem for multijurisdictional districts,' 8 9 the absence of oversight allows
for BIDs to assume even greater authority than initially intended"9 and leaves
open the possibility that conflicts of interest may go unmonitored. As a
subsequent section will demonstrate, city officials have implemented more
thorough oversight provisions only after harm has been done.' 9'
Perhaps the reason why the lack of an ongoing government role in the
affairs of a BID is so pronounced is because the difficulty in getting a BID up
185. See supra note 66.
186. JOHN M. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124-27 (1961), quoted in VALENTE,
supra note 66, at 98.
187. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Co., 197 U.S. 430, 433 (1905); see also
Alan H. Nichols, Comment, How Not to Contest Special Assessments in California, or You Can't Beat
City Hall, 17 STAN. L. REv. 247 (1965) (outlining possible challenges to special assessments).
188. BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 252. This, however, may be partially a result of the fact that
"[c]itizens have too little interest and consequently too little participation in the affairs of most districts."
Id. at 253.
189. See supra Section I.C.
190. As "one long-time observer" of private government has explained, these entities "move into
vacuums.. . . They get into one issue and they've got a professional here and a technician there. And
then they'll give you an opinion on what you're ordering for lunch. And before you know it, they've
named two of your children. They eat up power, like the science fiction movies. They eat living things,
derive power from what they've ingested, and develop an independent power base." GARREAU, supra
note 18, at 195; see also infra note 252.
191. See infra Section IV.D.
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and running is so intense."9 The process requires the approval of the city
planning commission, the community boards in which the district is located,
the board and president of the borough in which the district is located, 93 the
city council,"9 and the state comptroller.'" However, the ability of objec-
tors to the district to prevent its formation is sharply circumscribed. First, to
prevent the formation of a district, either fifty-one percent of the owners of
property in the district or the owners of fifty-one percent of the property in the
district must file an objection with the city clerk.1' Hence the burden is on
objectors to the district to come forward and register their dissent. '9 Second,
judicial review of district formation is limited to thirty days after its establish-
ment. 9 While those relying on the district certainly have a right to know
when the district is conclusively formed, limiting the period of review to thirty
days is a convenient way to limit disagreement.
Once the BID is actually established, the degree of oversight by politically
accountable bodies is relatively low. The mayor, comptroller, president of the
borough in which the BID is located, and council member representing the
district in which the BID is located each appoint a representative to sit on the
Board of Directors. 199 As noted above, however, the owners of property
within the district are guaranteed majority representation on the Board. The
BID is hardly accountable to district residents, for the residents are a
permanent minority. There is no ongoing review of BID activities. The statute
does not require any yearly reports or statements of expenditures from the BID;
no approval is required for specific proposed projects or improvements;'
a recent New York City Council report, relying on a survey of district
residents and tenants, found that few had any idea how their money was being
spent."' Furthermore, the BID is granted authority to operate in perpetuity.
The BID may be dissolved by vote of the City Council or upon petition of
either fifty-one percent of the owners of property in the district or the owners
of fifty-one percent of the property in the district, but only if it has no
outstanding indebtedness.2 °' However, there are no designated times at which
the City Council or any other responsible political body must examine the
192. At least one commentator has noticed this contrast: "While a prospective group must run the
gauntlet of city review boards on the road to BID-dom, the public has little recourse after the BID is
formed." Wolfson, supra note 169, at 21; see also CTEs WITHIN CmEs, supra note 75, at iv-v.
193. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
194. See id. at § 980-e-f.
195. See id. at § 980-g.
196. See id. at § 980-e(b).
197. See CITIES WITHIN CITIEs, supra note 75, at 18-19.
198. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-h(c).
199. See id. at § 980-m.
200. The City Council must first, however, vest the BID with the power to effect broad categories
of improvements. See id. at § 980-c.
201. See CrrES WITHIN CITIES. supra note 75, at 60-62.
202. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-n.
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question of whether to renew the BID's authority to operate. The presumption
is that the BID simply continues to exist; the danger is that it takes on a life of
its own. 20 3
Although part of the charm of Business Improvement Districts is that they
circumvent government red tape, this red tape often serves a useful purpose by
promoting public accountability. The absence of serious public scrutiny
increases the potential for conflicts of interest to arise. If BIDs really can be
run as personal fiefdoms of rich and powerful property owners, their claim to
assist urban renewal is tenuous at best. One problem with the Chicago park
districts discussed earlier is that they became "political prizes subject to
partisan manipulation."' As the New York statute includes no provision for
oversight to reduce and eliminate conflicts of interest, BIDs can easily turn into
massive "public" improvement projects that benefit certain private business-
es.
205
In sum, there are four distinct problems with the New York BID statute.
It creates an undemocratic structure, particularly in favoring property owners
over all other classes of voters represented on its Board of Directors; the
§ 501(c)(3) nonprofit status of the BID seems highly questionable in view of
the pecuniary goals it serves; affected citizens are afforded no voice in the
process creating BIDs; and meaningful accountability is absent. Of course, the
problems made clear from a close reading of the statute may not be the
problems BIDs create on a practical level. Hence the next section will take the
Grand Central Partnership as a case study to illustrate how these fears are
confirmed.
III. A CASE STUDY IN SUCCESSES AND FAILURES:
THE GRAND CENTRAL PARTNERSHIP
A. Successes
As a major gateway to one of the world's leading cities, Grand Central
Station would seem a natural magnet for investment. However, one realtor
commented in 1988 that the Grand Central Station area "'lacks what we call
classy amenities.'"' While part of the problem certainly was the low rental
203. As a BID may not be dissolved if it has any outstanding debt on its bonds, BID directors and
city officials could foreclose dissolution by not repaying debt or issuing more bonds. See id. at § 980-
n(a).
204. BOLLENS, supra note 18, at 136.
205. The possibility for conflict of interest suggests that there may be inurement to the benefit of
district operators, prohibited by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See supra note 119, and infra Subsection III.B.3.
206. Maurice H. Solomon, quoted in Mark McCain, Commercial Property: Grand Central Area:
Landlords Set Up a Special Tax to Upgrade District, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988, § 10, at 37.
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values for office space, the more obvious problems for the neighborhood were
ground level. Simply put, the Grand Central area was filthy and unsafe.
Seven years later, the area is certainly cleaner and, perhaps as a result,
safer.2 7 Street cleaners now patrol the area. 208 The Grand Central Partner-
ship (GCP) recently leased the dark and dirty space beneath the Park Avenue
ramp over Grand Central Station from the city and plans to set up a park and
restaurant in the space instead,' an improvement modeled on the Bryant
Park restoration project.210 One benefit, increasing both the cleanliness and
safety of the area, is street lighting; the Partnership installed 549 lampposts as
part of a $38 million capital improvement project.211 There is evidence that
these efforts are paying off: crime has been reduced by 50% in the GCP
area.2"2 Purse snatching went down by 38% in the adjoining Times Square
BID.213 Three-card monte, a trusty barometer of lawlessness, also went down
by 70% from June to August 1993 in the GCP area.2 14 The GCP has brought
pedestrian malls, taxi stands to help unsuspecting tourists, and a war on
graffiti,21 all for an assessment of 12.4 cents per foot in 1993.216 The
GCP's homelessness outreach program was also in full swing by the early
1990s. Outreach workers, many of them formerly homeless, would approach
street people and persuade them to take advantage of the food and social
services at the St. Agnes Drop-In Center on East 44th Street. One GCP official
estimated that by late 1993, over 150 formerly homeless individuals had passed
through the program and on to full-time jobs.217 All in all, the efforts of the
Grand Central Partnership seemed to vindicate the belief that BIDs were "the
best hope of getting parts of America's cash-strapped cities working
again."28 By attacking the problems of crime and grime, BIDs such as the
GCP seemed poised to reverse the flight of commercial capital from urban areas.2 19
207. Curing even minor maintenance problems may protect against crime. See, e.g., James Q.
Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 31.
208. See Martin, supra note 76, at B3.
209. Douglas Martin, Plan for Pershing Square Would Yield New Park, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1995, at B10.
210. See id. and notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
211. See Jim Simpson, Neighborhood Report, Midtown: Let There Be Light, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1995, § 13, at 6.
212. See Weiss, supra note 3, at 20.
213. Id.
214. See Oser, supra note 70, at 8. Measuring whether a decrease in crime has actually occurred
is virtually impossible as the areas around the GCP are covered by other BIDs; moreover, there has
been a dramatic decrease in crime in New York City over the past year such that it is hard to tell
whether reductions have been caused by GCP activity. See Clifford Krauss, New York City Crime Falls,
But Just Why Is A Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at 1.
215. Weiss, supra note 3, at 20.
216. See Oser, supra note 70, at 8.
217. See id.
218. City Services, supra note 1.
219. As one commentator noted, "Companies that leave the city for outlying suburbs cite crime and
dirty streets as two reasons for making the move. Business Improvement Districts have proven their
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B. Problems
The concentrated effort to reverse the Grand Central Station area's decline
came at a price. As the following discussion will demonstrate, the GCP took
full advantage of the flexibility granted by New York's BID statute to create
an entity threatening in size and power to the rest of the city, and even perhaps
to residents of its very own district. It is far from clear, moreover, whether the
GCP's overreaching was a critical element to its success. In fact, much of what
the GCP has accomplished in terms of safety and cleanliness could well have
been done by a less intimidating entity. Several minor scandals, and one major
scandal, surrounding the GCP may also chip away at its credibility, thereby
poisoning the waters for future BIDs.
1. The GCP and the Equal Protection Clause
First, the bylaws of the GCP, written in accordance with New York state
statute, violate the principle of one person, one vote by providing that the class
of owners of property in the district shall always have majority representation
on the Board of Directors,' 2 the forty-five person body that manages the
district. Specifically, the bylaws provide that the representatives of owners of
real property "shall at no time constitute less than a majority of the
Board," 22" ' and that residential tenants of the district shall have only one
representative on the Board.222 Property owners therefore always have a
majority vote on the Board of Directors even if they do not live in the district.
This means that BID President Daniel Biederman, who lives in the blue chip
Westchester suburb of Scarsdale,223 and Chairman of the Board of Directors
Peter Malkin, who lives in the equally comfortable suburb of Greenwich,
Connecticut,224 have more power over the district than the people who
actually live there. As a result of this provision, the 200 property owners in the
worth by reducing street crime and removing tons of litter from sidewalks. Their capital programs are
rebuilding our sidewalks and relighting our streets." North, supra note 5, at 19. This account is not
entirely accurate. A survey of all New York City BID residents and tenants found that roughly one-third
believed that business had not improved. See CITES WITHIN CMES, supra note 75, at 83. The same
survey found that about half of BID residents and tenants were dissatisfied with their investment. See
id. at 75-76.
220. In November 1995, two apartment owners in a building within the district filed suit against
the Board of Directors of the GCP alleging that this system of representation violated the principle of
one person, one vote. See Kessler et al. v. Grand Central District Management Ass'n, 95 Civ. 10029
(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 25, 1995); Thomas J. Lueck, Suit by Apartment Owners Challenges
Business District, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at B4.
221. Bylaws of the Grand Central Partnership, Art. II, § 1 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter
Bylaws].
222. Bylaws, Art. I, § 1.
223. See Wolfson, supra note 169, at 15.
224. See Bruce Lambert, Businessman with Low Profile and Big Impact Enters Spotlight, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, § 13, at 6.
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Grand Central Partnership have twenty-seven seats on the Board while the 920
residential tenants have only one.2' These bylaws set up a system in which
voting power is directly proportional to wealth and status, an arrangement
closer to the prerevolutionary Estates General of France 26 than to accepted
forms of American democracy.
227
Whether the GCP bylaws run afoul of the principle of one person, one vote
depends on whether New York BIDs can claim the exemption from Equal
Protection scrutiny established by Salyer. It seems, however, that the functions
of New York BIDs are not sufficiently specialized to claim this exemption. Far
from confining its efforts to one specific purpose, the GCP performs the
following activities, according to its District Plan: "1. security; 2. sanitation;
3. tourist information; 4. social services for homeless persons; 5. special
maintenance and repair; 6. public events; 7. retail improvements."2' The
GCP District Plan additionally commits funds to streetscape and capital
improvements.229 Performance of these many functions, any of which taken
alone would constitute the sole task of many special assessment districts,2 30
confer a great deal of power upon the GCP. More importantly, the broad and
far-reaching effects upon everyone in the district suggest that there is simply
no clear basis on which votes may be weighted where district services are so
broad in nature and effect.
The nature of the functions performed by BIDs, moreover, are governmen-
tal in nature. The range of "traditional government functions" has been defined
to include "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation.. . . [I]t is functions such as these which governments are
created to provide. "231 Some commentators maintain that BIDs or similar
225. See Lueck, supra note 220.
226. As one commentator describes these governing processes, "This one-dollar, one-vote
democracy harks back to the earliest days of the Colonies, when the vote was reserved for white male
owners of property because they were viewed as having the biggest stake in how the society was run."
GARREAU, supra note 18, at 200.
227. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, "[A] state violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter
• . .an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth . .. ." 383 U.S. 663, 666
(1966). Applying this test in Burrey v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement District, 488 P.2d 395
(Cal. 1971), which required a municipal improvement district to conform to the principle of one person,
one vote, the California Supreme Court agreed: "It should also be pointed out that the inequality of
voting strength in this case, as compared to district apportionment cases, is all the more questionable
for being based directly upon the land-wealth of the voter." Id. at 401. Note, however, that the
municipal improvement district in Burrey, also vested with powers quite similar to that of New York
BIDs, was the sole governing authority in its area, id. at 399, something not true of New York BDs.
228. GRAND CENTRAL PARTNERSHIP, AMENDED DISTRICT PLAN FOR 1994, at 9 (copy on file with
author) [hereinafter GCP PLAN]. These functions are typical of New York BIDs. See CInEs WITHIN
CITIES, supra note 75, at chart following 77.
229. See GCP PLAN, supra note 228, at 13-14.
230. See supra note 96.
231. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 851 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 501 (1985). Some states even specify that BIDs are
government entities. See, e.g., TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 375.004 (West Supp. 1996).
Yale Law & Policy Review
entities are "shadow governments" ;232 others declare BIDs to be "private
governments." 3 These appellations are more than useful turns of phrase:
they accurately capture the role served by BIDs as well as the degree of power
they enjoy. Hence New York BIDs cannot claim immunity from the principle
of one person, one vote, as they "exercise general governmental powers," and
"perform important governmental functions" which affect all residents of the
district. 234 The assessment on owners of property is collected in precisely the
same way as ordinary taxes,235 which further underscores the parallels
between the quasi-government of the BID and other forms of local government.
Privileging the votes of owners of property, therefore, seems geared largely
to protecting the interests of this class over all others. This inequitable
arrangement is quite common among these entities.236 When the types of
services are narrow and limited, such exclusion may be acceptable, as the
Court indicated in Salyer. However, a far different situation exists when BIDs
make decisions that affect large numbers of people in many ways both within
and outside the district. The difference between these districts and those in
Salyer indicates that residents in the district must enjoy equal voting rights.2 37
The unequal voting arrangement is particularly troublesome as residents of the
district are assessed on the same basis as owners of industrial or commercial
properties.238
This concern for the rights of residential tenants stems not from an abstract
theoretical commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment but from a concern for
accountability. Even if the City of New York is able to provide oversight for
BID activities, it is equally important that members of the district have some
control over the entity that operates on their behalf. The recent City Council
survey of BID residents and members found that they were generally left in the
dark due to poor outreach by BID management. 239 Respondents had doubts
232. GARREAU, supra note 18, at 186-87.
233. Pack, supra note 27, at 18.
234. Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53-54. Performance of governmental functions may suffice to turn a
putatively private entity into a state actor, thereby requiring adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991) (holding private party's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors would constitute impermissible state action).
235. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-j(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996) provides that the City of New York
levies and collects this assessment as part of its general taxation function, then passes these monies back
to the GCP. The District Plan confirms this procedure. See GCP PLAN, supra note 228, at 15-16.
236. See Pack, supra note 27, at 20; Houstoun, supra note 14, at 14 fig. 2.
237. A New York Times editorial agreed: "The most important issue is governance. Boards of
directors ought to be broadly representative of the communities they serve .... A BID for Reform,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at A20.
238. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-j(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996). This section provides that:
"The expense and cost apportioned to benefited real property in accordance with the plan shall be a
charge upon each benefited parcel of real property within the district." The District Plan also specifies
the means of assessment. See GCP PLAN, supra note 228, at 16. Note that not-for-profit and public
purpose buildings are exempt from taxation, which explains why Grand Central Station itself is not
taxed.
239. See Crrs WITHIN CMES, supra note 75, at vii, 23.
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as to whether their investment in the BID was paying off, and noted that the
absence of any complaint process at any BID made it difficult for them to
register their concerns.' BID apologists insist that BIDs draw enough public
scrutiny because they exercise power over large and important sections of
urban areas,24 but the extent of this power argues for more systems of
control rather than fewer. As a disgruntled resident of the Center City Business
District in Philadelphia, one of the nation's most successful BIDs, puts it: "'I
never elected [the BID's directors] to anything ... and I can't vote them out.
That's a fine situation to have in the birthplace of democracy.'"242
2. The GCP as a Nonprofit Entity
The privileging of property owners to the exclusion of other affected
classes of district residents also speaks volumes about the appropriateness of
the GCP's nonprofit status. In general, "[flew states allow nonprofit corpora-
tions to administer districts, "243 and the GCP is a good example of why states
should so refuse. First, the undemocratic system of voting is at odds with
important principles of New York nonprofit corporation law.2" Second, the
dominance of property owners, and the procedures they have set into place,
suggest that the BID is largely a profit-making endeavor. The Grand Central
Partnership's performance of the abovelisted functions is intended for "the
promotion and enhancement of the District," 2" which presumably increases
the profit to each property owner. As such, BIDs have more commonly
inspired battles for cash rather than community participation to improve
depressed areas. Citing a war between factions of property owners over control
of one district, Robert Richards, executive director of the Chamber of
Commerce of Jamaica, Queens, complains: "Instead of cooperation, the BID's
are attracting greed." 24  The GCP is also hardly nonprofit material in
employing nonunionized workers and giving substandard pay;247 other BIDs
have contracted out to firms that supply undocumented immigrants. 4
One high-profile activity of the GCP is especially indicative of its attempts
to enrich its own members under the pretense of improving city life. The GCP
240. See id. at 26, 75-76.
241. See Andrew M. Manshel, Business ImprovementDistrictAccountability, CITYLAw, Dec. 1995,
at 102, 105. Many of the oversight provisions Manshel mentions, moreover, were adopted only after
the GCP embroiled itself in scandal. See infra Subsection III.B.4.
242. Quoted in Julie Liedman, If You Clean It, They Will Come, Bus. PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 1991.
243. Houstoun, supra note 14, at 17.
244. See supra Section II.B.
245. GCP PLAN, supra note 228, at 9.
246. Lueck, supra note 9, at 1; see also CITIES WITHIN CITIES, supra note 75, at 33-40 (describing
conflict of interest problems in Jamaica BID).
247. See David Henry, As City Cuts Services, Firms Tax Themselves to Keep Streets Clean and
Safe; It Works, but is it Good Public Policy?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 23, 1992, at 27.
248. See CITIES WITHIN CMES, supra note 75, at 57-58.
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has recently sponsored tougher city regulations against book vendors within its
district,249 on the grounds that "[r]etailers have complained for many years
that street peddlers, who don't have the same overhead costs, sell for
less."250 Part of the argument, expressed by Bruce Cohen, a spokesman for
the GCP and the 34th Street Partnership, was as follows: "I happen to love
vendors.. . .But there are places for them to be and places where they should
not be.""5 In other words, "not in my backyard." The GCP has also called
for increased enforcement of a law that would push out of the area sidewalk
food vendors, purveyors of hot dogs, gyros, bagels, and knishes. 2 GCP
President Biederman justified the move by declaring that such lawlessness was
"very much of a piece with truancy and squeegee enforcement."" More
likely is that, like book vendors, food carts compete with district retailers' own
ability to turn a profit. Why the burden of competition should be placed onto
neighboring areas, which can likely afford it less, is far from clear.
The nonprofit status of the GCP is also vitiated by its violation of the
nondistribution constraint on nonprofit activity. If "the very essence of a
nonprofit corporation is its commitment not to distribute profits to controlling
persons, "254 there are real problems with current management procedures.
The President of the GCP, Daniel Biederman, earns a salary of $315,000 for
operating three BIDs at once, 5" which is more than what the mayor,256 any
borough president, city council representative, or community board representa-
tive makes. Furthermore, an outside audit pointedly criticized the GCP's
expenditure of $1.3 million to install floodlights on a building owned by Peter
Malkin, Chairman of the Board of Directors. More money was spent on
Malkin's building than on any other.257 These are not isolated problems.258
As the aim of the GCP is to increase the district's opportunities for profit-
making, and those controlling the GCP are the major profit-makers within the
district, it seems impossible not to violate the nondistribution constraint. This
in turn suggests that nonprofit status is inappropriate for BIDs. To operate
under the profit motive of a BID while granting it nonprofit status strains
credibility, and simply amounts to a massive tax subsidy to already wealthy
249. See Judith Evans, Street Vendors Will Have to Book, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1993, at 41.
250. Id.
251. Judith Evans, It's A Living, Barely, Say Peddlers on City Streets, NEWSDAY, Apr. 14, 1993,
at 37.
252. See Douglas Martin, City Begins Enforcement of Food Cart Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 1994, at B3. This crusade seems to vindicate the concern expressed supra note 190 ("And then
they'll give you an opinion on what you're ordering for lunch.").
253. Id.
254. Hansmann, supra note 119, at 511.
255. See Lueck, supra note 12.
256. See Lambert, supra note 10, at Al.
257. See Lueck, supra note 12.
258. Excessive salaries is a problem for many BIDs. See Crrs WrrHIN CrrIES, supra note 75, at
63-64.
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areas. When so many other municipal needs go unmet, such areas hardly
deserve top priority.
3. The Impact of the GCP on the City
While it has been argued that "a successful downtown produces economic
benefits throughout the city," 9 the harms such districts cause are all too
evident. Business Improvement Districts, especially successful ones, may
simply push problems of crime and grime into adjacent neighborhoods, may
reduce the district's willingness to participate in and support local government;
and attract more than its share of investment and funds, setting its interests at
odds with those of the city at large. The relative novelty of BIDs renders many
of these impact assessments somewhat premature; however, these trends are
already emerging, both in New York City and other parts of the country.
The increase in cleanliness and safety in the area served by the GCP is
clear; less clear is whether the district may have simply moved these problems
elsewhere, to less wealthy districts less able to cope with these problems. One
study of BIDs points out that "the declining crime rates claimed by many BIDs
may simply move crime across the district border. "2" The GCP's success has
also shifted other social problems to neighboring areas. One member of a
community board adjacent to the GCP complained: "'What we're concerned
about is moving homeless people from place to place, based on a community
group's ability to pay. ' "2" In other instances, such as its war on food cart
vendors, the GCP has pursued a policy of spillover, simultaneously asserting
its right to be free of certain burdens and its right to lay these burdens on other
areas.
A second potentially negative impact on the city stems from the district's
self-contained package of services financed by a special assessment. Although
there has not yet been extensive study on the issue, most analysts believe that
the additional assessments placed on taxpayers within special districts will
decrease their tolerance for general tax increases.2" Guided by this intuition,
New York City community boards that were traditionally responsible for many
of the local government functions now performed by BIDs have called for
limitations on the power of BIDs, fearing that "property owners who opt in to
quasi-governments opt out of the real one."263 Social critic Jonathan Kozol
259. Houstoun, supra note 14, at 18.
260. Pack, supra note 27, at 20.
261. Sylvia Friedman, head of Community Board 6's committee for homeless and homeless
services, quoted in Marvine Howe, Homeless Program Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, § 13,
at 6.
262. See Pack, supra note 27, at 20 ("Still another cost to others will arise if the BID increases the
opposition of downtown businesses to general tax increases.").
263. Krohe, supra note 53, at *7.
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has persuasively linked the opting out of wealthier areas with the increased
disempowerment of poorer ones:
The mayor insists that "all the people of the city" will be shouldering the human
costs of his decisions; but this is obviously not so. The costs of cuts in sanitation,
for example, are incurred and felt almost immediately in the South Bronx. Their
consequences are significantly diluted in those neighborhoods where sanitation, like
so many other basic services, is being purchased more and more through private
means by local business and homeowners' groups, which have been granted semi-
governmental taxing powers to raise money locally and spend it locally, another
stage in the secession of the fortunate from common areas of shared democra-
cy.2
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The fragmentation of interest created by BIDs could have deeply divisive
effects on city life. The two-tier system of assessment, moreover, also seriously
hampers the redistributive function of taxation:
[Ilt may appear that 'downtown' is obtaining an unfairly increased share of
resources. If the BID response to such a criticism is that it is paying for its new
services, community groups are likely to argue that the level of public security or
cleanliness in a neighborhood should not be a matter of ability to pay.265
The disparity between city districts becomes even more skewed as more and
more businesses move into BIDs, leaving behind neighborhoods with weaker
tax bases.26
A third negative impact of BIDs is that even as they become less willing to
contribute to the municipal coffers, they also draw investment away from other
sources of funding. One authority explains that because "downtown business
interests are not notably powerless," BIDs "could thus divert resources from
elsewhere. "267 One example is bonds. The GCP's $32 million bond issue268
in 1992 was the first time the city had approved a bond issue of this scale by
a private group.269 Compounding the problem was first, that the bond issue
counted against the city's borrowing limit,27° and second, that the bonds were
264. JONATHAN KOZOL, AMAZING GRACE: THE LIVES OF CHILDREN AND THE CONSCIENCE OF A
NATION 109 (1995). Many BID residents agree that despite promises not to do so, the City has been
scaling back its sanitation efforts because it believes the BIDs will pick up the slack. See CITIES WITHIN
CITIES, supra note 75, at 78-79.
265. Pack, supra note 27, at 20.
266. See id. at 20 ("BIDs may draw the most vigorous businesses, capable of paying the additional
assessments, to the downtown from other parts of the city where services are inferior, causing a further
decline in already troubled neighborhoods.").
267. Id. at 19. At one point, the GCP was receiving a grant of half a million dollars from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
268. See Martin, supra note 76.
269. See Dale Fuchs, $30M Sidewalk Facelift; Group Has Grand Ideas for Grand Central Area,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 1992, at 27.
270. See Bruce Weber, Dinkins Authorizes Bond Issue to Improve Grand Central Area, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2. 1992, at B8.
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rated A-i, two notches above New York City's own bonds.27 Thus the
GCP's bond issue attracted investment away from the City the GCP is
purportedly helping. In this respect, many of the weaknesses plaguing
enterprise zones, particularly that "these zones simply intensify the bidding
wars that already pit cities against each other to attract investment"272 apply
equally well to BIDs. Recognizing these problems, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
has recently announced that he will attempt to sharply limit or eliminate the
power of BIDs to issue their own bonds.273
As previously discussed in greater length,274 individuals outside the
district are without a voice in the process of creating a district. Yet their lives
and fortunes may be adversely affected by the formation and operation of a
BID. Although courts have generally been unable to develop an appropriate
standard to empower these individuals, the degree of harm experienced by all
city dwellers from an overweening, domineering BID such as the Grand
Central Partnership calls for some legislative remedy.
4. Insufficient Oversight: The GCP's Greatest Scandal
The abovementioned problems are serious ones. However, they pale in
comparison to the GCP's greatest public relations disaster, an incident which
more than any other impropriety has prompted a reevaluation of BIDs. On
April 14, 1995, the New York Times broke the story of the GCP's "goon
squads."275 As the Times reported, the Partnership ran a training program for
formerly homeless individuals which involved, among other things, rousting
currently homeless people from sidewalks, doorways, and ATM lobbies, using
violence if necessary. As one member of the "goon squads," Sylvester
Williams, explained to the City Council: "We did go out and beat people up.
I know for a fact that we done it, because I was part of it. And Frank Schiazza
[the GCP's director for social services] told us to do it."276 Mr. Williams,
one of the four men who told their story to the Times, recanted a week later
when six unknown assailants beat his girlfriend and sent her to the hospital.
271. See Henry, supra note 247, at 27.
272. Dreier, supra note 13, at 1394. Dreier characterizes this problem as "robbing St. Petersburg
to pay St. Paul." Id.
273. See Clifford J. Levy, Mayor Seeks to Limit Business Improvement Districts' Bonds, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at BI.
274. See supra Section Bl.C.
275. Bruce Lambert, Ex-Outreach Workers Say They Assaulted Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1995, at BI. As one worker explained, "We beat people at Sixth and Waverly... We beat people at
Tudor City. We beat people at 51st and Third. We beat people at 86th and Third. We beat people at
Herald Square and Greeley Square. We beat people at the Roosevelt Hotel." Id. According to the former
workers, GCP officials, who came up with the name "goon squads," told them to "do whatever you
have to do" to get other homeless people to leave designated areas, including the advice to "hold a
nonverbal conversation." Id.
276. David Firestone, 3 Tell Council They Beat Homeless to Clear Out Business District, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 1995, at B1.
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After the beating, he received an anonymous call asking him to meet with
Schiazza and recant his allegations, which he did.277 Mr. Williams later
reiterated his initial account to the City Council.278 Although officials of the
Partnership denied they had ever told any member of their outreach program
to use physical force,279 the former outreach workers said that GCP officials'
"meaning was always clear but never explicit."280 This was not the first time
that improprieties or violence had been alleged in the GCP's treatment of
homeless individuals.2 ' In early 1995, homeless advocates brought a suit
charging that the homeless participants in the GCP's "job training" were being
paid below minimum wage: the "job training" was really more a cheap labor
program for the Partnership. 2" Participants were paid only $1.16 an
hour.2
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The revelation that the GCP was running a "social services"/"job training"
program which hired homeless people at $1.16 an hour to beat up other
homeless people unleashed a storm of criticism. The United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development and the Manhattan District Attorney's
Office both commenced investigations into the GCP's homeless services
program; 2 4 eventually, HUD rescinded its grant of $547,000 to the
GCP.285 Explaining the agency's decision, Assistant Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development Andrew M. Cuomo cited "substantial evidence" of
harassment and brutality, then concluded: "There's no doubt that these things
happened. "286 The City's Department of Homeless Services launched its own
investigation to determine whether the $1.6 million it allocates every year to
the GCP's outreach program was properly spent.2" An internal review of the
277. See Firestone, supra note 276.
278. See id.
279. See Bruce Lambert, Charges of Rousting Homeless Are Made Up, Group Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1995, at B3.
280. Lambert, supra note 279.
281. The arm of the GCP that provided social services, the Grand Central Social Service Center,
has also been sued by a homeless man claiming that workers at the Center threw him through a glass
window and a second homeless man claiming that workers at the Center poured boiling water over him.
See CITIES WITHIN CITIES, supra note 75, at 86-90.
282. See Archie et al. v. Grand Central Partnership, No. 95 Civ. 0694 (SS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb.
1, 1995); see also Thomas J. Lueck, Homeless Sue Over Wages, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, § 13, at
6.
283. See Archie, No. 95 Civ. 0694; see also Edward R. Silverman, Abuse by BIDs Called Into
Question; Critics Say More Oversight Needed, NEWSDAY, Apr. 15, 1995, at A15.
284. See Dwight R. Worley, Feds Probe Alleged Beatings by BID; Partnership Could Lose HUD
Grant, NEWSDAY, May 27, 1995, at A21; see also Thomas J. Lueck, Grand Central Partnership is
Subject of U.S. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at B4.
285. See Bruce Lambert, Group Bullied the Homeless, Agency Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995,
at BI.
286. Id. HUD also discovered that money it had given to the GCP specifically for temporary
shelter, meals, and loans for permanent housing had been instead diverted to the outreach program. See
id.
287. See Dwight R. Worley, Abuse Reports Spur HUD to Rescind Grant, NEWSDAY, July 6, 1995,
at A7.
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GCP's social service program by homeless advocate Robert Hayes found that
the program was poorly structured and managed, and lacked sufficient
oversight.288 Citing the Hayes report, one major sponsor of the program,
Chase Manhattan Bank, cancelled its $450,000 contract with the GCP and said
it would use its own professional guard service to police ATM lobbies.289
Although GCP officials insisted that they had completely revamped the
program following the Hayes report, 2" homeless advocates were not so sure.
Doug Lasdon, executive director of the Urban Justice Center, a homeless
advocacy organization, commented: "'[I]t's curious that after all this scandal,
the entire management staff has remained intact. Not one of those people
responsible at the top has been changed.'" '291
The "goon squads" disaster was not the only impetus to increasing
municipal oversight for BIDs. Even before the story broke, GCP President
Daniel Biederman was under investigation for having improperly diverted GCP
resources to help create another BID in Jersey City.2" Biederman is known
as the "Mayor of Midtown" since "the area under his jurisdiction is greater
than many large cities. "293 In an effort to restrain such power, Mayor
Giuliani announced on April 22, 1995, one week after the "goon squads" story
broke, that a City Hall auditing agency would conduct routine independent
audits of every district's finances. 2" In November of the same year, a City
Council inquiry completed "the first government review of the self-taxing
improvement districts that have proliferated in New York City in the last
decade"295 and found a wide variety of serious problems, including vastly
inflated salaries for BID executives, conflicts of interest, illegal loans, use of
illegal immigrants at below minimum wage, poor financial management, and
dissatisfaction among property owners in the districts.296 The report also
concluded that GCP President Biederman should "not be allowed to take on
any more districts." 2  While the recommendations of this report are compel-
288. Hayes's report found the program "conceptually flawed, with incompatible roles of security
protection and social work. And he found its workers poorly screened, trained and supervised." Bruce
Lambert, Claims of Homeless Abuse Lead to Program Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at B3.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. Quoted in id.
292. See Improving the Improvement Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, at A30; see also
Lueck, supra note 12.
293. Weiss, supra note 3, at 20.
294. See Karen Rothmyer, City to Oversee BID Finances, NEWSDAY, Apr. 22, 1995, at A15. Even
in the wake of a study detailing numerous improprieties by BIDs seven months later, however, Deputy
Mayor for Economic Development John Dyson cautioned against too much regulation and oversight.
See Vivian S. Toy, City Districts Reject Calls for Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at B5.
295. Lambert, supra note 10. See generally CITIES WITHIN CMES, supra note 75.
296. See id. at Al, B6; see also A Bid For Reform, supra note 237. See generally CrrIES WrrHIN
CmES, supra note 75.
297. Lambert, supra note 10, at B6.
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ling, it is unfortunate that more conscientious oversight did not happen before
the GCP and other BIDs had caused such problems.
The efforts to provide greater oversight and accountability for BIDs are
critical to restraining their power and occasional lawlessness. Most commenta-
tors recognize this much. A New York 7mes editorial emphasized that, "As
BIDs have proliferated rapidly, growing pains were inevitable. More thoughtful
oversight can make them better."298 Community Board #5 representative
Nicholas Fish agrees that, "'The irony is that the BID's have a splendid record
of achievement in improving communities, but their internal processes are so
sloppy."'299 Reviewing the misadventures of many New York City BIDs, a
report to the City Council concluded that, "it is imperative that BIDs be held
to a high degree of accountability."" However, rethinking BIDs cannot
begin and end with merely increasing oversight; as some of the preceding
sections of this Note indicate, several fundamental changes are in order. The
next Part of this Note will propose some of these changes.
IV. RESTRAINING THE POWER OF BIDS: SOME PROPOSALS
Underlying the legal and political arguments developed in this Note is a
straightforward normative proposition: BIDs should not be allowed to become
vehicles for private profit and exclusion under the guise of reversing the
decline in America's cities. If city officials and state legislatures allow BIDs to
become enclaves for the wealthy who run the show within the area they
govern, they will have contributed to the "secession of the successful."301
One commentator agrees: "A potentially high cost of BIDs may be a perception
of inequity that exacerbates existing social divisions."3"2 BIDs may deepen
social divisions by structuring differential levels of government services
according to class and by allowing the rich to outvote poorer urban mass-
es.3 °3 Speaking of similar entities in the residential context, urban sociologist
Jane Jacobs apocalyptically concludes: "'It's a gang way of looking at life, the
institutionalization of turf. And if it goes on indefinitely, and gets intensified,
it practically means the end of civilization.""' ° Rice University sociologist
Stephen Klineberg concurs: "'If I'm making it, it's not my responsibility to
298. Improving the Improvement Districts, supra note 292.
299. Quoted in Lueck, supra note 9.
300. CITIES WITHIN CrrIEs, supra note 75, at 98.
301. Reich, supra note 162. Leanne Rivlin, professor of environmental psychology at the City
College of New York, explained further: "BIDs represent a narrowing of the public sphere. Our society
has become very exclusionary, and BIDs contribute to that trend." Wolfson, supra note 169, at 21.
302. Pack, supra note 27, at 20.
303. As one BIDs opponent has pointed out, "it is not so much government itself to which the
wealthy object as the idea of being governed by those poorer and more numerous than they. 'Us' being
governed by 'them.' And BIDs have offered a way out of this distasteful aspect of democracy."
Gallagher, supra note 178, at 787.
304. Quoted in David Dillon, Fortress America, PLANNING, June 1994, at 12.
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look after others. That's the direction American society seems to be going, and
it's ominous. It will destroy us in the end.' "" For government to aid and
abet this retreat from civic responsibility is deeply problematic, "a shameless
abdication by the city of its responsibility to the people of New York. ""
The separatism of BIDs is doubly cynical because the initial justification for
the creation of BIDs was to improve the welfare of America's cities.3"7 If
BIDs are able to manipulate hopes for urban renewal to line their own pockets,
state legislatures will have made a significant mistake in authorizing their
creation. Even as many scholars advocate greater integration as the solution to
urban ills,308 BIDs have the reverse effect. The experience of the Grand
Central Partnership illustrates how BIDs may simply move their problems onto
other areas of the city less able to handle these burdens. Shaping a role for
BIDs in urban renewal first involves bringing these entities back to earth. As
one newspaper editorialized: "A BID is not a nation state. It exists to fill in the
gaps . . . . BIDs aren't beyond the reach of the U.S. Constitution, the state
constitution or the city charter."" Urban improvement coalitions will hardly
be built around domineering organizations that forget these fundamental facts.
BIDs can make a positive difference. Many do.31° The Pitkin Avenue BID
in Brooklyn has done an excellent job providing security to the district, not
simply by providing security personnel, but also by tracking the crime rates
across the district to determine which security measures worked and which did
not.311 Many smaller districts in other parts of the city have done a tremen-
dous job of fighting crime and grime without some of the harmful effects of the
GCP.312 Personalities matter as well. Robert Walsh, head of the 14th Street-
Union Square BID, has received acclaim for his skill in creating a united
coalition for improving the fortunes of all citizens in his district, evincing a
special commitment for helping the life prospects of children in the neighbor-
hood.3"3 Finally, the Times Square BID has a successful, professionally
operated social services program for homeless individuals, proving that such
services are possible if done properly. 314 The close examination of the Grand
305. Quoted in id. at 10.
306. Wolfson, supra note 169, at 21.
307. See supra note 143.
308. See Cisneros, supra note 13, at 634-35 ("This intensified spatial, racial, and social isolation
of the inner-city poor is the single most significant aspect of American urban decline in the latter half
of the twentieth century. Successful urban revitalization depends on our willingness to confront it.").
309. Wake-Up Call; BIDs are not Above the Law, NEWSDAY, July 7, 1995, at A28.
310. See generally CITIES WITHIN CITIES, supra note 75, at 94-97 (lauding accomplishments of
various BIDs in New York area).
311. See CITIES WITHIN CITIES, supra note 75, at 44-45.
312. See David Henry & Barbara Selvin, Other Districts Make Good on a Smaller Scale,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 23, 1992, at 29 (citing example of Myrtle Avenue BID in Brooklyn).
313. See, e.g., Robert Lifsyte, On the Civic Side of the Profit Motive, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995,
§ 13, at 1.
314. See CITIES WrrHIN CITIES, supra note 75, at 92-93.
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Central Partnership is not intended to demonstrate what we can typically expect
of BIDs, but instead what happens when they are improperly structured and
administered.
Creating more democratic and socially responsible BIDs has costs. State
law privileges property owners over all other classes of district members
because they generally have the strongest economic interest in the success of
the BID. Once representation on the BID's board of directors is equally
apportioned, the BID's expenditures may become more diffuse and less
efficient. To some degree, this may undermine the very point of the BID's
existence: BIDs usually perform municipal services more cheaply than the
city.315 Furthermore, imposing more oversight provisions may stifle creativity
and initiative by binding the entrepreneurial spirit in red tape.3 16 Without
such constraints, however, BIDs could use their quasi-governmental power for
private profit rather than public good. As the following recommendations
indicate, the normative choices embodied in the New York BID statute do not
represent the only way BIDs can or should be designed.
There are several ways in which BIDs can be more appropriately
organized. First, internal BID procedures should be guided by the principle of
one person, one vote. As discussed in preceding sections, much of the case law
regulating special assessment districts developed within the framework of
highly limited-purpose entities such as water reclamation districts. The
jurisprudence must adapt to adequately address the problems caused by more
complicated entities like BIDs.317 It can begin by requiring these organiza-
tions to share power on a more democratic basis.318 Reserving a majority
voice on the Board of Directors to property owners within the district only
adds to the perception that BIDs are fiefdoms for the wealthy and powerful.
Weighted voting not only amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause; it generates poor decisions uninformed by the impact a BIDs' policies
might have upon those outside a very privileged class.
315. See Lueck, supra note 9; see also GARREAU, supra note 18, at 199 (quoting Robert C.
Ellickson, who argues: "There's no question that [private governments] are faster and cheaper. The
incentives for prompt performance are stronger in the private sector.").
316. See, e.g., Manshel, supra note 241, at 106.
317. Manhattan Borough President Ruth Messinger has recognized this problem: "'state action
triggers such constitutional protections as the Equal Protection Clause and the 'one person, one vote'
standard. Clearly, the current voting and decision making procedures employed by BIDs do not meet
this standard.'" Quoted in Gallagher, supra note 178, at 790.
318. Several states' BID statutes require adherence to the principle of one person, one vote. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-25-1203, 1209 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 190.006(3)(a)-
2.a, 190.003(16) (Harrison Supp. 1993). Other states, however, also appear to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-9-38-11(2) (Michie Supp. 1996) (members of Board
of Directors must own real property); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 400, § 5, at 20-21 (West Supp.
1996) (majority vote of property owners determines Board of Directors); W. VA. CODE § 8-13A-11
(1995) (majority of Board shall be owners of commercial property).
Vol. 15:283, 1996
Restraining the Power of Business Improvement Districts
Second, BIDs should not be able to incorporate as § 501(c)(3) non-
profits. s 19 Although the tax savings are great, there is no way to accommo-
date these entities without warping the law of nonprofits. BIDs inherently
violate the nondistribution constraint essential to the proper operation of
nonprofits because their very aim is to generate profit. Hopefully, greater
accountability, oversight, and attention to the needs of the city as a whole may
make the nonprofit designation a more appropriate one sometime in the
future.2 For now, the emphasis on improving the profits of its members
argues against treating BIDs favorably as § 501(c)(3) nonprofits.
Third, the state legislature must give a greater voice to affected citizens in
determining whether a BID should be created and maintained. Such proposals
have already been floated: "Both New York city and New York state
politicians want to curb BIDs by curtailing the amount of debt they can take on
and limiting their life to ten years." 321 As BIDs cannot be dissolved if they
have any outstanding debt,3" the key to perpetual existence is in their
hands. 3" Yet BIDs need not be forced out of existence after ten years,
particularly if they have not fulfilled their part in fostering urban renewal.
Instead, the question of whether a BID should be allowed to continue operation
after a certain period should be subject to a citywide referendum. If the public
is not granted a voice in determining whether to form the BID in the first
place, although this Note suggests that it should, referendums should come at
shorter intervals of every five years. Placing BIDs at the mercy of public
opinion is perhaps the only way to remind such entities that their very
existence is intended to benefit urban welfare, not private fortunes.324
Fourth, both municipal and state authorities need to increase their oversight
of BID activities. The independent audits of BID finances announced by Mayor
319. Few other states specify that BIDs are nonprofit entities. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-54B-20
(Michie 1994) (BID is nonprofit exempt from state taxes).
320. As well as more consistent with the stated legislative purposes for creating the BID. See supra
note 143.
321. City Services, supra note 1, at 24. Many other states have automatic review provisions,
lacking in the New York legislation. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-43-9 (1993) (district ends in five
years); MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-43-131 (1995) (property owners only, not city council, may vote to
reauthorize district); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-12-1141 (1993) (district must be reauthorized every ten
years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-63-15 (Michie 1995) (city council must renew every five years). A recent
City Council report, however, has recommended that property owners should have an election every
five years to determine whether the BID should continue operation, see CITIES WITHIN CITIES, supra
note 75, at 20, an imperfect solution in its failure to broaden the franchise.
322. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-n(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996). This is a typical requirement.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-184-130(c) (Michie 1987); CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 36650 (a)
(West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-1225 (West Supp. 1995).
323. There are some ways around this problem: W. VA. CODE § 8-13A-15(b) (1995) provides that
a BID may not issue bonds for which the repayment schedule is greater than ten years.
324. More stringent oversight provisions may do this as well. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE
§ 3665 0 (a)(1) (West Supp. 1996) (BID may be dissolved upon finding of mismanagement); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-541 (1994) (city may dissolve "[ulpon finding that there is no longer a need" for district);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.608(5)(b) (west 1990) (city may dissolve at any time).
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Giuliani are a right step in this direction. The analysis of this Note is in
agreement with Giuliani's point that, "[b]ecause BID's serve as a public-private
partnership and receive monies levied by the public, it is perfectly appropriate
that they be subjected to reviews and audits on a regular basis."" The
conflicts of interest and incidents of self-enrichment that have plagued the GCP
were all readily preventable.32 6 The assumption of new district functions must
also be more carefully policed. How expertise in dealing with crime and grime
should presumptively translate into handling homeless people is unclear; 3
27
the very fact that this assumption seems to have been made by the GCP should
have set off alarm bells. In the area of municipal oversight, BIDs have much
to learn from the experiences of special districts, which were subject to a wide
degree of regulation:
Other provisions to deter misconduct include[d] the powers possessed by governors
to remove directors for cause or, more rarely, to veto authority activities. Some
authorities are empowered or required to hold public hearings before taking certain
actions. A majority of authorities are required to submit annual reports to executive
officials or state legislatures. The presence of state or locally elected officials as ex
officio members of an authority's governing body may also keep authority policies
in harmony with those of general governments. 28
Several of these provisions, particularly the last one, are already in place and
329simply need more vigorous enforcement. While one great advantage of
BIDs is the way they avoid red tape to get things done, the experience of the
GCP advises against granting too much latitude in this respect.
Fifth, legislatures and municipalities should increase aid to poorer areas33 °
to enable them to create their own districts. As one authority on BIDs
comments: "We should make sure there are many of these things, including in
325. Thomas J. Lueck, City Hall Agency Will Review the Audits of Business Zones, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1995, § 1, at 27.
326. For a thorough conflict-of-interest statute, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-1209(3) (West
1995). See also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-711(B) (West Supp. 1995) (members of Board of
Directors serve without pay); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.070 (West Supp. 1996) (same);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-412(1) (1991) (same).
327. See Letter from Max Silverstein, Emeritus Professor, School of Social Work, University of
Pennsylvania, to PHIL. INQUIRER, May 29, 1992 (on file with author) (opposing Philadelphia BID's
efforts to create social service program).
328. Analysis of Authorities, supra note 33, at 1433. There are some such provisions already in
effect in some states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 1507 (Supp. 1994) (annual review of district
operation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:56-88 (West 1992) (providing for annual audit of BID expenses);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-84-519(d) (1992) (state legislators serve on board of directors). In some cases,
political control is quite extensive. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-4021 (1991) (Board all appointed
by mayor); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 9-55-5 (same) (Michie 1995).
329. New York State Senator Manfred Ohrenstein of Manhattan also has proposed oversight
legislation. See Wolfson, supra note 169, at 21.
330. Several states target underserved areas for improvement districts. See, e.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. § 7-12-2101 (1993) (providing for rural improvement districts); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 375.003(4) and § 375.222 (West Supp. 1996) (special benefits for minority-owned businesses).
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poor business districts, which could be able to do the same things if they had
some help from the city."33' Currently, the New York City Department of
Business Services discourages districts from forming where the tax base is
weak;332 in other words, where the district is most needed. Deputy Mayor
John Dyson has explained that "his goal is to see Manhattan . . . blanketed
with such districts . . . at least south of 96th Street. " 333 96th Street, as
Jonathan Kozol points out, "is the point at which the Harlem ghetto starts on
the East Side" and wealthy Manhattan ends.334 In many ways, the solution
is simply to supplement enterprise zone legislation to include business-
enhancing services. Current enterprise zone legislation would give priority to
community policing, community development banks, drug prevention, worker
training, housing, and child care.335 Additional enterprise zone services could
include security, sanitation, business improvement, graffiti removal, and
streetscape improvements: exactly the services BIDs presently provide.
Balancing these considerations will not be easy. As the New York Times,
itself a major participant in the Times Square BID, explains: "The challenge
is to hold B.I.D.'s to the highest performance and ethical standards without
smothering an innovative movement that contributes to the city's livability and
economic vitality. "336 It is hoped that the proposals advanced by this Note
may meet this challenge. Otherwise, we are faced with the false alternatives of
granting carte blanche to profit-hungry behemoths or tossing aside yet another
failed initiative to reverse urban decay.
V. CONCLUSION
Special districts helped build our cities. It would be a sad historical irony
if their descendants, Business Improvement Districts, tore our urban areas
apart. Concerted efforts to increase oversight, compel BIDs to adhere to
democratic principles, and link their success to the city's welfare are
prerequisites for the survival of BIDs. BIDs should not be abolished simply
because some entities, such as the Grand Central Partnership, have become
vehicles for private profit and brutality rather than civic virtue. They have too
much potential to offer. Barbara Wolff, Assistant Commissioner of the New
York City Department of Business Services, frequently describes meeting a
GCP snow shoveler working furiously during a blizzard. When asked why he
was bothering to assume such a difficult, if not Sisyphian, burden, he told her,
331. Krohe, supra note 53, at *7 (quoting Janet Rothenberg Park).
332. STARTING AND MANAGING, supra note 75, at 2.
333. KOZOL, supra note 264, at 109.
334. Id.
335. See Aprill, supra note 166, at 1363.
336. Improving the Improvement Districts, supra note 292.
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"'Well, this is my job . . . I'm making New York City a clean place.'" 3 37
If the United States is to make a serious attempt at resolving its urban crisis,
we cannot afford to lose this spirit. On the other hand, if BIDs are allowed to
be too powerful, profit-hungry, and high-handed, we cannot afford the risks
they pose to America's cities.
337. Quoted in Martin, supra note 76, at B3.
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